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I. CHINA IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL ECONOMY
World economic power is shifting to the Far East. Some observers
suggest that the next century will be the "Asian era."' If the prediction of an
"Asian era" connotes world economic dominance by Asian nations, it is
undoubtedly overstated. The far more likely scenario, and what observers
probably mean, is that the global economy of the twenty-first century will be
seamless, with the nations of East Asia becoming increasingly important and
perhaps even indispensable participants.2 In either case, Asia will not play a
full role in the world economy until China approaches the status of a newly
industrialized country.3
Observers have offered various explanations of China's strategic
significance in the Asian, as well as global, economy. One commentator has
noted, for example, that while Japan prospers and Taiwan and South Korea
continue to develop, these economies are merely "tiny prosperous islands on
the edge of a sea of poverty. "I That sea is China. Although China is no
longer as poor as it once was, its still-backward economy poses significant
problems for these "tiny prosperous islands." Thus, China will not be left
alone. Another theory posits that the world economy will complete its
evolution from the U.S.-dominated regime of the first postwar generation to
a tripolar system consisting of an economically united Europe, the United
States, and the Pacific region.' In this tripolar structure, China, with a
population of one billion and the highest rate of economic growth in the
world, cannot be excluded.6 An American economist observed the prefigura-
tions of the third theory ten years ago: the likelihood of China's becoming a
machine for economic growth that could easily drive the economies of East
and Southeast Asia well into the twenty-first century.7
China presents a host of economic opportunities. Its rich natural resources
and potentially huge market have strong appeal for foreign investors. Direct
foreign investment in China has increased greatly in recent years, reaching a
1. See, e.g., JOEL KOTKIN & YoRHio KISHIMOTO, THE THIRD CENTURY: AMERICA'S RESUROENCE
IN THE ASIAN ERA 1-4 (1988).
2. Francis K. Vita, Business in the Far East: An Overview - Reshaping Political and Corporate
Decision Making, in BusiNESs OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FAR EAST: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE GUIDE TO
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 3, 19 (Lawrence Chimerine et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter BUsINESs
OPPORTUNITNES IN THE FAR EAST].
3. Jack Maisano, Asian Business Letter, ASIAN Bus., Jan. 1989, at 19, excerpted in ALEXANDER
BEHER, THE PACIFIC RIM ALMANAC 601 (1991).
4. Ia
5. See Fred Bergsten, From Cold War to Trade War, ECON. INSiaTS, July-Aug. 1990, at 1, 2.
6. See Wang Kangmnao, Xifang dui Zhongguo de Jingii Zhicai he Zhongguo Jixu Kaifang Zhengce
de Guoji Huanjing [Western Economic Sanctions Against China and the International Environment for
China's Continuing Open-Door Policy], in Xu DIANQING ET AL., ZHONGGUO JINOJI GAIGE: FENXI,
FANXING, QiANzHAN [CHINA'S EcONOMIC REFORM: ANALYSIS, REFLECTIONS AND PROSPECTS] 227, 236
(1991).
7. Albert Keidel, Analyzing China's Data, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 8.
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cumulative total of approximately $22 billion in 1991.8 For a number of
reasons, however, this critically needed foreign investment remains far below
its potential level, despite the economic appeal of China as a site for direct
foreign investment.9
First, the Chinese market is not right for every company, and it poses
challenges for most that enter it."0 China's inadequate infrastructure,
continued administrative red tape, and unstable financial and monetary system
make it a difficult place to do business."1 While important, these internal
challenges are beyond the scope of this article.
Second, many prospective investors still consider major investments in
China risky. International investment always involves a number of risks.
Businesses must make decisions based on a "pragmatic calculation of risk"
and predicted return. 2 If non-Chinese enterprises perceive that investing in
China carries risks that outweigh the potential rewards, many of them will be
deterred from doing so. Risks likely to concern prospective investors in China
include those typically associated with foreign exchange transfers, a country's
external debt (and the concomitant risk of default, resulting in a far less
favorable economic climate in general), the exercise of sovereign immunity
in the event of a dispute with a state-owned enterprise, and the nationalization
or expropriation of foreign assets by a host government.
Some of the risks often associated with investing in China are more
imagined than real. When investors assess risk before choosing any course of
action, however, their perception is the reality. Because China holds
tremendous investment opportunities, and because many potential foreign
investors are wary of investing there, foreign businesspeople must be fully
informed about investment risk in China. Toward that end, this Article
explores one particular kind of risk: the risk of nationalization or expropria-
tion with insufficient compensation for the taking. Part II briefly examines the
basic concept of host-government takings of direct private foreign investments.
There are many forms of takings, the two most important being nationalization
and expropriation. After we define terms, however, we usually use "expropri-
ation" in the remainder of the article as a convenient generic term for the
various forms. Part III explores the unsettled debate over the proper
compensation standard for expropriations. This debate concerns not only
8. See The Tan Stirs, EcoNOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 3; Sino Xenophilia, EcoNoMIST, Nov. 28,
1992, at 13.
9. Direct investment in China has taken the form of equity and contractual joint ventures, oil
exploration by foreign companies, and wholly foreign-owned business enterprises. PIL.UP D. GRUB &
JiAN HA! LiN, FOREIGN DIRECT INvEsTmENT IN CmINA 77 (1991). Indirect investment, primarily lending
and bond purchasing by non-Chinese private and public entities, constitutes China's external debt. Id. at
78.
10. Jamie P. Horsley & Sue-Jean Lee, The Chinese Business Environment, in BusINEsS
OPPORTUrmS IN THE FAR EAsT, supra note 2, at 537, 553.
11. The Faltering State, EcoNoMisT, Nov. 28, 1992, at 8.
12. Roger W. Sullivan, Commentary, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 6, 7.
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China, but practically all of the world's sovereign states. To understand how
this debate affects contemporary assessments of expropriation risk in China,
one must explore its broader theoretical and practical context.
Part IV offers a detailed analysis of expropriation risk in China, focusing
both on the risk of expropriatory events occurring and the question of
compensation if such events take place. The analysis includes a study of
relevant Chinese scholarly writings, explicit and implicit expressions of
government policy, pertinent provisions of the Chinese Constitution and
Chinese statutes, and actual Chinese practice.
The thesis of this Article is that a thorough analysis of expropriation risk
(along with other risks not discussed herein) is essential to making a fully
informed decision about whether to invest in China and, if so, to what extent.
Based upon this analysis, we conclude that, in light of the remaining
ambiguity about China's intentions, expropriation-related risks remain
meaningful, even if not great. Nevertheless, the assessments of American
investors, based as they are on political rhetoric over tensions between West
and East and between developed and developing nations, overestimate these
risks. The meaningful risks that do remain should not forestall foreign
investment, given the combination of economic imperatives in China, recent
Chinese practices, and the enormous opportunities for prospective investors.
II. NATIONALIZATION, EXPROPRIATION, AND OTMER HOST-GOVERNMENT
TAKINGS OF FOREIGN ASSETS
Nationalization, expropriation, and other host-government takings are
among the most frequently cited examples of political risk associated with
foreign investment. Potential foreign investors often treat the presence of this
class of risk as a key factor in decisions not to invest. This is true regardless
of tax breaks and other incentives the host government may offer, because,
in the end, investment incentives matter little in the face of a significant
expropriation risk.3
The controversy surrounding nationalization, expropriation, and the
standard for compensation is a longstanding one. Although massive waves of
nationalization and expropriation took place after World War II, there have
been even more takings-related disputes in the last two decades.14 In recent
years, nationalization and expropriation activity of various types has been
common in Africa, Asia, Western Europe, and other locales.
15
13. INGRID DETTER DE Lupis, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPINO
COUNTRIES 135 (2d ed. 1987).
14. Brice M. Clagett, Present State of the International Law of Compensation for Expropriated
Property and Repudiated State Contracts, in 1989 PRivATE INvESTORS ABROAD 12-1, §12.03, at 12-10
(1990) [hereinafter Clagett, Present State].
15. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTRNATiONAL LAW 430 (1986).
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Many terms are used to describe the various circumstances in which a
host government appropriates foreign-owned property. The most important are
expropriation and nationalization.16 International business practitioners,
business journals, and the general news media have used the term "expropria-
tion" to describe a range of host government actions, from "the sudden
enforcement of previously unenforced foreign controls to outright confiscation
and physical takeover."17 The classical definition of expropriation is simply
the taking of an isolated item of foreign-owned property. Some commentators
distinguish between individual expropriation and general expropriation.18 In
individual expropriation, the seizing government expressly mentions both the
person and the property affected by the dispossession. In the case of general
expropriation, the seizing government does not direct the action against the
specific private property of a particular individual. General expropriation may
either be connected with changes in the economic or social structure in a
16. Other forms of host-government takings of foreign assets include "creeping expropriation,"
.requisition," and "confiscation."
Creeping expropriation has been defined as "any act, or series of acts, for which the state is
responsible, which are illegal under domestic or international law, and which have a substantial enough
adverse effect on either the enterprise or the investor's rights under the enterprise." Robert B. Shanks,
Insuring Investment and Loans Against Currency Inconvertibility, Expropriation, and Political Violence,
9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 417, 425 (1986). In its standard contract, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation provides that a covered expropriatory action includes any action that (1) is
authorized by the government of the project country, and (2) prevents the investor from (a) receiving
payment when due, (b) effectively exercising its fundamental rights with a foreign enterprise, (c) disposing
of securities or any rights accruing therefrom; (d) exercising effective control over the use and disposition
of a substantial portion of its property, (e) constructing or operating a project, or (f) repatriating
investment earnings or capital. DE LUPIs, supra note 13, at 148.
Other examples of creeping expropriation include the state's exercising monopoly power over a
sector of the economy in a way that deprives the foreign investor of anticipated economic freedom in a
related sector, subjecting necessary economic activities to onerous licensing requirements, giving
preferential treatment to citizens over noncitizens, and applying taxation and regulatory measures to a
foreign enterprise so as to make the operation of the enterprise ultimately fruitless. K.C. Kotecha,
Comparative Analysis of Nationalization Laws: Objectives and Techniques, 8 CoMp. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR.
87, 92-98 (1975).
Another form of host-government taking is "requisition," a state's temporary taking of private
property, usually under exigent circumstances. Requisition is usually a war-time measure, and may or may
not be compensated. SUBHASH C. JAIN, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY - A STUDY IN NORTH-
SOUTH DIALoGUE 30 (1983). Requisition differs from traditional expropriation not only in its motive and
surrounding circumstances, but also in the fact that payment, if any, is commonly made after the seizure
of the property, with the state using the urgency of its need to justify expostfacto payment. Id. at 30-31
(citing BEN A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-37 (1959)).
"Confiscation" denotes any taking without compensation. In its legitimate punitive sense, the term
frequently describes actions such as government seizure of criminals' property, illegally transported goods
(such as narcotics or pornography), or property detrimental to national security. When the motive is more
political than penal, it may describe the uncompensated taking of property from a class of persons because
of their nationality. See MICHAEL BOGDAN, EXPROPRIATION IN PRiVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1975).
Thus, the absence of compensation and a punitive motive, whether legitimate or illegitimate, are the
hallmarks of a confiscation. See also HANs RAI, PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: PROPERTY AND
NATIONALIZATION IN INDIA 22-23 (1989) (arguing that punitive nature of taking is even more important
than absence of compensation in characterizing taking as confiscation).
There are many other kinds of takings, some involving mixed forms and motives. See BOGDAN,
supra, at 12.
17. J. FREDERICK TRUnT. EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVEsTMENT 5 (1974).
18. See, e.g., SAMY FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1953).
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particular country or may be aimed at the exclusion of private capital from a
particular sector of the national economy.' 9 In many instances, the term
general expropriation is essentially synonymous with "nationalization."
When properly used, the term "nationalization" refers to a state's
undertaking a number of individual expropriations with the common aim of
partially or totally restructuring the country's economy. 2 The government
takes property not because it belongs to certain owners, but because it is of
a certain type. Although nationalization and individual expropriation are not
precisely equivalent, they both involve the exercise of sovereign authority by
a state over property within its borders for the purpose of accomplishing a
compulsory transfer of property rights from private to public ownership.2'
For private international investors, the only significant differences
between expropriation and nationalization are the implications for compensa-
tion and for the future of other investments in the host country. The key to
evaluating the future of other investments is to assess the motivation of the
expropriating nation:' "The prototype of a nationalization is the taking of
an entire industry or a natural resource as part of a plan to restructure the
nation's economic system. In this instance, the values underlying sovereign
rights theories are most strongly implicated, and full compensation is typically
not required."' In contrast, if a government expropriates an investment, it
singles out the foreign investor as the target of governmental action that is not
part of a national public plan; the expropriation can be viewed as discrimina-
tory. In this case, the argument for full compensation is stronger.24 From the
perspective of a private international investor trying to assess risk by
predicting the future behavior of a host government, news of an individual
expropriation consequently suggests a lower degree of risk than does news of
a nationalization in one part of the country's economy.' Such an investor is
likely to be less interested in the stronger argument for full compensation in
the case of an individual expropriation than in the signal about future trends
that a widespread nationalization conveys.
19. Id. at 6.
20. See TRurrT, supra note 17, at 5 ("An expropriation may be an isolated and even arbitrary act
of government, but a nationalization usually signifies 'pursuance of some national political programme
intended to create out of existing enterprises, or to strengthen, a nationally controlled industry.'") (citing
WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 120-21).
21. See GaLiAN WHrrE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 50 (1961).
22. TRurr, supra note 17, at 6.
23. RICHARD SCHAEFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENvIRONMENT 458 (1990).
24. Id.
25. See TRUIrr, supra note 17, at 6.
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HI. THE COMPENSATION STANDARD: FROM THE HULL RLE TO
APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION AND PERHAPS BACK AGAIN
In assessing expropriation risk, a prospective foreign investor is
concerned not only with the probability of government actions negatively
affecting the investment's value to the investor, but also with the likelihood
of receiving compensation that approximates the actual value of the investor's
loss. Once an alleged expropriatory action has occurred, two issues are
usually the most significant for the foreign investor. First is whether the
relevant conduct constitutes an expropriation for which the state is liable and,
if so, the date on which the taking occurred.26 Second is the extent to which
the investor should be compensated. ? Because there is less fundamental
theoretical disagreement about the first issue than about the second, this
Article does not explore the general international law concepts relating to the
first. It does, however, examine the second issue from a theoretical perspec-
tive, because that issue continues to engender uncertainty throughout the
world. Furthermore, an explication of the general theoretical debate about
compensation standards is necessary to understand fully China's attitude
toward the compensation question. An adequate assessment of this complex
aspect of Chinese investment risk demands a corresponding sensitivity to the
nation's historical, recently evolving, and current policies. Consequently,
when the Article moves its focus specifically to the outlook for foreign
investors in today's China, it discusses the evidence as it relates both to the
risk of expropriatory actions actually occurring there, and to the Chinese view
of the compensation issue.
Few subjects of international law have generated more controversy than
the standard for payment of compensation when governments expropriate
foreign-owned property.2" Government officials, investors, practitioners, and
scholars have long debated the proper standard 9 - specifically, whether the
expropriating state is obligated to pay "full" or merely "appropriate"
compensation.2°
Developed and developing countries have favored different approaches.
Some developed countries, especially the United States, have long viewed a
standard of "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation as the "tradi-
tional" rule of general international law. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull
first articulated the rule in his 1938 notes to the Mexican government
26. See Charles N. Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Compensation:
A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 21 INT'L LAW. 639, 643
(1987).
27. Id. at 658.
28. See Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121, 121 (1984).
29. Sherry P. Henry & Stephen Bainbridge, Recent Developments, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 993, 996
(1984).
30. See Andrew B. Derman, Nationalization and tre Protective Arbitration Clause, 5 J. INT'L ARB.
131, 138-39 (1988).
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demanding compensation for expropriated lands owned by American
nationals."' The United States has since repeatedly asserted the Hull rule in
formal government documents, 2 statements by government officials,3
commercial treaties,34 and notes to other countries.35 Moreover, in 1964
and 1965, Congress reaffirmed the Hull rule as the American view of
customary international law in the Hickenlooper Amendments to the Foreign
Assistance Act.36 American courts, however, remain somewhat less con-
vinced that the Hull rule actually represents customary international law.
37
Although one may explicate the traditional Hull rule in several ways, a
relatively succinct statement may take the following form. "Prompt" means
that the government must either pay compensation from the time of taking or
make a definitive commitment at or before the taking to determine, by an
expressed future date, the amount of compensation with interest at reasonable
rates. "Effective" essentially translates to "readily convertible and repatri-
able." Payment with nonconvertible currency or relatively illiquid assets, such
as bonds not tradable on an established market, is not effective compensation,
nor is payment accompanied by significant restrictions on repatriation.
"Adequate" generally has been interpreted as "full." In the case of an
operating enterprise with reasonable prospects of continuing as such, "full"
compensation usually means the recovery of the going-concern value of the
business.38
31. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CAsES AND MATERIALS 687-89 (1980).
32. E.g., U.S. Aide-Memoire, Expropriation of United Fruit Company Property by Government of
Guatemala, Aug. 28, 1952, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL. 357 (1953).
33. E.g., Loftus E. Becker, Just Compensation in Expropriation Cases: Decline and Partial
Recovery, 1959 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 336, 341. Mr. Becker was Legal Adviser to the U.S.
Department of State.
34. E.g., Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Apr. 3, 1961, U.S.-Vietnam, art. 4(2), 12
U.S.T. 1703, 1707; Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, U.S.-Fr., art. 6(3), 11 U.S.T. 2398,
2403; Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Nov. 12, 1959, U.S.-Pakistan, art. 6(4), 12 U.S.T. 110, 113;
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Dec. 20, 1958, U.S.-Muscat-Oman, art. 4(2),
11 U.S.T. 1835, 1837.
35. E.g., U.S. Informs Cuba of Views on Agrarian Reform Law, 40 DEP'T ST. BULL. 958 (1959);
U.S. Protests Cuban Property Seizures, 42 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 158 (1960); U.S. Protests Cuban Seizures
of Property, 43 DEFT. ST. BULL. 316 (1960); U.S. Calls Attention to Cuban Inconsistencies on Sugar
Trade, 43 DEPT. ST. BULL. 360 (1960).
36. Pub. L. No. 88-633, 78 Stat. 1013 (1964) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1988));
Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat. 659 (1965) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1988)). The 1964
and 1965 Hickenlooper Amendments created an exception to the act of state doctrine as it had been
announced in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The amendments specified that
the act of state doctrine, which barred judicial inquiry into actions taken by a foreign government within
its territory, would not apply in U.S. courts if the action violated international law. 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2). U.S. courts would apply the act of state doctrine if the expropriating nation "[took]
appropriate steps... to discharge its obligations... including speedy compensation for such property
in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value thereof." 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(C).
37. For example, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.
1981), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the "appropriate
compensation" standard, not the Hull rule, as customary international law, although the court noted that
appropriate" does not always mean "less than full." See infra text accompanying notes 81 to 87.
38. Clagett, Present State, supra note 14, at 12-3.
Going-concern value, a fundamental concept of finance and accounting, is commonly
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Satisfying the demands of the Hull rule has proved to be beyond the
means of many developing countries, and, consequently, many of them have
continued to reject the rule.39 They have offered various justifications for
paying less than full compensation. For example, they have claimed that they
may deduct "excess" profits from the compensation, with excessiveness
sometimes determined by objective standards such as whether the original
investment has been essentially recouped, and sometimes determined by the
whim of the host government.' Developing countries have also claimed that
the taking is a form of recompense for past colonial exploitation by the
investor, and that no compensation is necessary. 4' Where expropriation is of
a punitive nature, they have argued that no compensation need be paid,42
with the rationale for punitive action ranging from alleged colonial exploita-
tion to other actions of the foreign investor deemed culpable by the host
government, such as payment of low wages to native workers. In addition,
developing countries have suggested that an ad hoc decision of the host
government, which might weigh such factors as its ability to pay, should set
the level of compensation.43
The commonly proposed alternative to the Hull rule is the standard of
"appropriate compensation," which, unsurprisingly, has received consistent
support from the practices of developing countries. The principle also has
received support, however, from U.N. resolutions and other documents,'
three important international arbitral decisions,45 and, somewhat surprisingly,
understood as including the reasonable market value of the business as a viable going concern
with the anticipation of future profits. If an active market exists in the locale for the particular
type of business as a going concern, the market price of the company's shares or evidence of
prices paid for sales of comparable businesses may suffice to determine going-concern value.
Brice M. Clagett & Daniel B. Poneman, The Treatment of Economic Injury to Aliens in the Revised
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 35, 64 (1988). In many cases, however, there is
insufficient evidence of this type to value the business as a whole. In such instances, the appraiser must
ascertain the individual market values of tangible and intangible assets, as well as the discounted present
value of anticipated future profits. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d
at 892; see also Clagett & Poneman, supra, at 64-65 ("The most commonly used method for measuring
the present value of anticipated future profits is the "discounted cash-flow" method.").
39. See M. Sornarajah, Compensation for Expropriation: The Emergence of New Standards, 13 J.
woRLD TRADE L. 108, 123 (1979) (discussing what author perceives as new set of standards for
determination of compensation).
40. When the government of Chile expropriated a foreign firm's shares in the national copper
industry, for example, the power to determine the amount deducted was within the sole competence of the
Chilean president. Id. at 124.
41. Dale B. Furnish, Peruvian Domestic Law Aspects of the La Brea Y Parifias Controversy, 59 KY.
L.J. 351, 369-71 (1971).
42. Sornarajah, supra note 39, at 127 (citing RICHARD D. ROBINsON, NATIONAL CONTROL OF
FOREIGN BUSINESS ENTRY (1976)).
43. Wang Weicheng, Lun Guoyouhua de Shidang Buchang Yuanze [On the Appropriate
Compensation Standard for Nationalization], 1987(2) JIlN DAXUE XUEBAo [J. JIN U.] 13, 18
[hereinafter Wang, Appropriate Compensation].
44. E.g., Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
45. Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. (AMINOIL), 21 I.L.M. 976, 1032-34 (Reuter,
Fitzmaurice & Sultan, Arbs., 1982); Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libyan Arab Republic, 20
I.L.M. 1 (Mahmassani, Arb., 1977); Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. (TOPCO) v. Libyan Arab Republic,
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.4 None of these practices,
documents, or decisions describe the "prompt, adequate, and effective"
requirement of the Hull rule as a customary principle of international law or
as an otherwise authoritative standard.47 Although the term "appropriate
compensation" is defined in different ways in different contexts, it has been
consistently interpreted as a less-than-market-value standard that usually takes
into account the host nation's ability to pay.48 In its various forms, the
appropriate compensation standard arguably has become a majority rule in
expropriation cases since World War II by means of the continual explicit and
implicit rejection of the Hull rule in favor of other theories.49 We now
examine some of the highlights of this trend.We close the discussion with
evidence that the debate is far from over and that the Hull rule actually may
be regaining some of its lost vitality.
A. U.N. Documents and Their Interpretation
A series of documents adopted by the United Nations has played an
important role in the evolution of the appropriate compensation standard. In
1962, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1803, which concerned
sovereign control over natural resources. Article 4 of the resolution specified
that the remedy for expropriation of an alien's property is payment of
appropriate compensation in accordance with the rules of the expropriating
state and in compliance with international law.5" As is often the case with
legislative "solutions" to controversial political or diplomatic issues, the
difficult questions associated with specific application were left unanswered.
In this case, the General Assembly left the word "appropriate" undefined.
Developed countries naturally supposed that the term "appropriate
compensation" indicated the Hull rule." For instance, Adlai Stevenson,
American Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that "appropriate
compensation referred to in the section meant prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. "" It has been argued that the lack of opposition to Steven-
17 I.L.M. 1 (Dupuy, Arb., 1977).
46. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 892 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting
that appropriate compensation standard "may well ... come closest to reflecting what international law
requires").
47. Schachter, supra note 28, at 127.
48. See Timothy M. Hanstad, Comment, Philippine Land Reform: The Just Compensation Issue, 63
WASH. L. REv. 417, 438-39 (1988).
49. See G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 44, art. 4.
50. Id.
51. See Subrata R. Chowdhury, Permanent Sovereignty and Its Impact on Stabilization Clauses,
Standards of Compensation and Patterns of Development Co-operation, in PRnmANENT SOVEREIaNTY
OVER NATuRAL REsouRcES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42, 59 (Kamal Hossain & Subrata R. Chowdhury
eds., 1984).
52. Ambassador Stevenson's letter was written in opposition to the Soviet Union's proposed
amendment to Resolution 1803, which would have provided for compensation to be paid only according
to the host nation's law. Letter from Ambassador Adlai Stevenson (Dec. 21, 1962), reprinted in
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son's statement, the United Nation's rejection of a Soviet-proposed amend-
ment that assessed compensation in accordance with only national laws, and
an explicit acceptance in Article 4 of international standards, indicate that the
"traditional" norm of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation remains
inviolate.5'
Scholars and officials in developing countries have demonstrated different
understandings of Article 4 of Resolution 1803. Chinese scholar Weicheng
Wang asserts that through express recognition in U.N. documents such as
Resolution 1803 and consistent rejection of the prompt, adequate, and
effective standard in actual practice, the new "appropriate compensation"
principle became the accepted standard.54 Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Senior
Advocate of the Supreme Court of India, observes that developed nations are
probably incorrect to assume that the "appropriate compensation" principle in
Resolution 1803 mirrors the Hull rule. After examining the origins of the
principle and its relevance to equity, unjust enrichment, and good faith, he
concludes that something akin to the developing nations' notion of appropriate
compensation has been a customary rule of international law at least since the
adoption of Resolution 1803 in 1962."5
Several later U.N. resolutions have attempted to resolve the ambiguity of
Resolution 1803. Resolution 3171, adopted in 1974, provides that "each State
is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of
payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in
accordance with the national legislation of each state carrying out such
measures. "56 In the same year, the U.N. Declaration on the New Interna-
tional Economic Order (NIEO) asserted that host countries should have the
power to determine the amount of compensation.5 7 The resolutions of several
agencies within the United Nations reveal similar trends. For instance, Article
2 of Resolution 88 of the U.N. Commission for Trade and Development states
that "it is for each state to fix the amount of compensation."58 Furthermore,
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted in 1974 as
General Assembly Resolution 3281, requires that "appropriate compensation
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 403,406-07
(1963).
53. Stephen M. Schwebel, The Story of the U.N. 's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A. J. 463, 465-66 (1963).
54. See Wang, Appropriate Compensation, supra note 43, at 13.
55. See Chowdhury, supra note 51, at 59, 71.
56. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR,
28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974).
57. Declaration on the Establishment ofa New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, 4, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). The basic premise of NIEO is
that political and economic power should be shifted from developed to developing nations. Jonathan I.
Charney, Technology and International Negotiations, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79 (1982). Developed
countries have not, of course, embraced this view. They have, however, recognized the validity of NIEO's
primary procedural point: developing countries, usually acting as a group, have the right to negotiate with
developed nations on issues of power and wealth shifting. Id.
58. UNCTAD Res. 88, U.N. TDBOR, Supp. No. 1, at 1, art. 2, U.N. Doc. TD/B/421 (1972).
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should be paid... taking into account the relevant laws and regulations and
all the circumstances that the state considers pertinent."59 The Charter's
language appears to make payment of any compensation optional, while
Resolution 1803 requires "appropriate" compensation as an element of a legal
expropriation.
60
The U.N. General Assembly resolutions, and, to a lesser extent, the
resolutions of U.N. agencies, have generated significant controversy. Some
commentators from developed countries claim that U.N. resolutions are
recommendations rather than lawmaking instruments, and are therefore not
legally binding.6' According to the most extreme version of this argument,
the resolutions of the early 1970s pointing toward recognition of an appro-
priate compensation standard do not even furnish evidence of a newly
emerging customary rule.62 Academic commentators and government
officials from countries with relatively underdeveloped economies, however,
normally take the view that U.N. General Assembly resolutions can create
new rules of international law.63
As Ian Brownlie, a noted British international law scholar, has written:
In general these resolutions are not binding on member states, but, when they are concerned
with general norms of international law, then acceptance by a majority vote constitutes
evidence of the opinions of governments in the widest forum for the expression of such
opinions. Even when they are framed as general principles, resolutions of this kind provide
a basis for the progressive development of the law and the speedy consolidation of
customary rules.6'
After listing a number of important "lawmaking" resolutions,65 he concludes:
"Literature in English all too often fails to indicate the significance of such
instruments. In some cases a resolution may have direct legal effect as an
authoritative interpretation and application of the principles of the Charter."66
59. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 50, 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
60. Kenneth M. Siegel, The International Law of Compensation for Expropriation and International
Debt: A Dangerous Uncertainty, 8 HAsTINGs INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 223, 238 (1985).
61. See, e.g., Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295, 301 (1975).
62. Brice M. Clagett, Protection of Foreign Investment Under the Revised Restatement, 25 VA. J.
INT'L L. 73, 90 (1984) [hereinafter Clagett, Revised Restatement].
63. Mark E. Ellis, The New International Economic Order and General Assembly Resolutions: The
Debate Over the Legal Effects of General Assembly Resolutions Revisited, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 647,
649 (1985).
64. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (3d ed. 1979).
65. E.g., G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Do. A/64/Add.l (1946) (affirming
"the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment
of the Tribunal"), reprinted in 2 U.N. Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 1951 (1962); Declaration on the Prohibition
of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp.
No. 17, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Do.
A14684 (1960); G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 44, at 15; Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess.,
Supp. No. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A15515 (1963).
66. BRoWNLIE, supra note 64, at 15.
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A noted Chinese scholar relying on Brownlie's analysis has asserted that U.N.
General Assembly resolutions are sufficient to show that the appropriate
compensation principle is a generally accepted rule of international law. 7
On balance, we believe that, because the United Nations is not a
lawmaking body and has no real power to enforce law, U.N. resolutions
cannot be viewed as establishing binding legal principles. When very large
majorities of the world's sovereign states agree to them, however, they carry
substantial moral authority, so much so that they ought to be treated as
powerful evidence of customary international principles. Therefore, a flexible
compensation standard, whether labeled "appropriate" or something else,
should be treated as a rule of customary international law. If so, the
expropriation risk faced by prospective investors in China is theoretically
greater than it would be if the Hull rule represented customary international
law. Indeed, the Hull rule is seldom controlling in actual disputes. Given the
questionable status of the Hull rule, trends in claims settlement are likely to
be more important to investors assessing investment risk than anyone's view
of an international principle's label or content.
B. Decisional Authority
Decisions in several important adjudications between 1977 and 1982
provide support for the argument that a flexible appropriate compensation
standard has emerged as customary international law. The first was the 1977
arbitration award in Texas Overseas Petroleum Company (TOPCO) v. Libyan
Arab Republic,6" one of a series of disputes arising from Colonel Muammar
el-Qadaffi's nationalization of the Libyan oil industry in the mid-1970s. The
President of the International Court of Justice appointed Rene-Jean Dupuy,
Secretary General of the Hague Academy of International Law and Professor
of Law at the University of Nice, as the Arbitrator.69 In his decision, Dupuy
stated that because a majority of member states supported Resolution 1803's
mandate of appropriate compensation, the Resolution expressed an "opinion
juris communis" (common legal opinion), and thus reflected "the state of
customary law existing in the field. "70 Oscar Schachter has emphasized that
Dupuy did not mention that the United States, when voting in favor of
Resolution 1803, expressly interpreted the appropriate compensation provision
as meaning prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.71 Although this
interpretation was quite controversial, the United States withdrew a proposal
to include this language in the resolution, supposedly because of its "confi-
67. See Wang, Appropriate Compensation, supra note 43, at 13.
68. 17 I.L.M. 1, 3 (Dupuy, Arb., 1977).
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id. at 30.
71. Schachter, supra note 28, at 127-28.
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dence" that the appropriate compensation provision would be so inter-
preted.' Schachter concludes that Dupuy's silence on the U.S. position in
the face of strident controversy, and the overwhelming vote for the resolution
without any qualification of the term "appropriate compensation," precludes
one from interpreting Dupuy's opinion as incorporating the U.S. position in
his recognition of Resolution 1803 as customary international law. 3
The 1977 arbitration award in Libyan American Oil Co. (LL4MCO) v.
Libyan Arab Republic74 arose in the same context as TOPCO. Like contracts
underlying other oil concessions expropriated by Libya, the LIAMCO contract
included a choice-of-law provision specifying that Libyan law was to be
applied in the event of a dispute to the extent that it was consistent with
principles of international law. Where Libyan law and international law
conflicted, "general principles of law, including such of those principles as
may have been applied by international tribunals," prevail. The arbitrator held
that Libyan law required payment of full damages, including lost asset values
and discounted future profits, for Libya's breach of the concession agree-
ment.75 He found that under both Libyan and international law the claimant
was entitled to the market value of its tangible assets, which he calculated to
be $14 million. With respect to the loss of intangible property rights and lost
profits, however, the arbitrator concluded that international law was much less
clear. International arbitral decisions predating World War II called for full
compensation, but were too dated to be relied on as precedent;76 post-World
War II lump sum settlements did not meet a full compensation standard.'
The arbitrator thus concluded that, although the classical formula of prompt,
adequate (full), and effective compensation continued as a "maximum and a
practical guide," it was not the only compensation standard under international
72. Id.
73. Id. Although Dupuy recognized Resolution 1803 as customary international law, he ultimately
did not have to apply the Resolution's appropriate compensation standard to the TOPCO case. The
concession agreement between TOPCO and Libya included a choice-of-law clause calling for application
of both international law and Libyan law, with international law to prevail in the event of conflict. Dupuy
found that Libya had breached its oil concession contract to retaliate against the United States and thus
violated both international and Libyan law. Because the expropriation lacked a legitimate purpose, the
preferred remedy was not compensatory damages but restitution in kind - return of the concession. This
remedy, of course, was unenforceable and impracticable, and the case was ultimately settled for what was
almost certainly an inadequate amount of compensation ($152 million of crude oil). Because Dupuy did
not have to reach the issue of what amounted to adequate compensation, his statements about Resolution
1803 and appropriate compensation were technically dicta; still, expropriation questions are so rarely
adjudicated in either judicial or arbitral tribunals that any statement by a respected tribunal is significant.
See Robert B. von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, InternationalArbitrations Between States and Foreign
Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476, 539-46 (1981) (discussing
principle of restitutio in integrum applied in arbitration).
74. 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981) (Mahmassani, Arb., 1977).
75. Id. at 54-56, 68.
76. Id. at 70.
77. Id. at 71-72. Lump sum settlements are those entered into by the expropriating government and
the government of which the claimant is a citizen, the latter government acting as a representative of the
claimant and perhaps other similarly situated citizens.
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law.7" Because Libyan and international law conflicted on the question of
compensation for intangibles and lost profits, the final portion of the choice-
of-law clause governed, and thus required the arbitrator to apply "general
principles of law." Without any real basis for interpreting the phrase, the
arbitrator found that such "general principles" authorized him to award
"equitable compensation. "I His award ultimately included an amount for lost
profits of $66 million (far short of LIAMCO's lost-profits claim of $186
million), bringing the total award to $80 million. Whether the award restored
the full value of the company's tangible assets or even came close to
compensating for lost profits is unclear."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, arose out of Cuba's
expropriation of property owned by American companies in the wake of the
Castro-led Communist revolution in the late 1950s."' The new Cuban
government expropriated four Chase Manhattan branches in 1960. At the
time, Chase had held substantial collateral on a loan that it had made to Banco
Nacional. Chase sold the collateral for an amount that exceeded the unpaid
loan balance by $7.2 million. It refused to surrender these excess proceeds as
well as over $2.5 million in deposits belonging to Banco Nacional. Banco
Nacional sued Chase in U.S. federal court for $9.8 million. Chase did not
dispute this amount, but counterclaimed for the value of its expropriated
Cuban branches.
Early in its analysis the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stated, "We begin with the recognition that our task in determining the
standard of compensation with respect to Chase's expropriation claims is to
apply principles of international, not merely local, law."82 After reviewing
much of the literature on the subject, the court concluded:
It may well be the consensus of nations that full compensation need not be paid "in all
circumstances" ... and that requiring an expropriating state to pay "appropriate compensa-
tion" - even considering the lack of precise definition of that term - would come closest
to reflecting what international law requires. But the adoption of an "appropriate
compensation" requirement would not exclude the possibility that in some cases full
compensation would be appropriate.'
78. Id. at 86.
79. Id. at 76.
80. See Derek W. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of
International Law, 35 CATH. L. REV. 929, 939-40 (1986); William C. Lieblich, Determinations by
International Tribunals of the Economic Value of Expropriated Enterprises, 7 J. INT'L ARB. 37, 46-51
(1990); Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past?: Modem Tribunals and the
International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 481 nn.51 & 60 (1991).
81. 658 F.2d 875, 877 (2d Cir. 1981).
82. Id. at 887-88. Prior to reaching the compensation issue, the court had concluded that the Cuban-
owned bank was not protected from Chase's counterclaim by the act of state doctrine, for several reasons.
First, the government seeking sovereign immunity for its actions had initiated the suit, and the private
claimant was merely seeking an offset rather than affirmative relief. Second, the U.S. executive branch
(acting through the State Department) had advised the court that the act of state doctrine should not be
applied. Third, there was no evidence that the court's adjudication of Chase's claim would interfere with
delicate foreign relations. Id. at 884.
83. Id. at 892 (footnotes and citation omitted). The court explicitly rejected Cuba's contention that
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Chase had sought $8.6 million in compensation for the full going-concern
value of its four expropriated branches, including lost future profits. The
district court had placed a going-concern value of $6.9 million on the
branches." The court of appeals held, however, that Chase was entitled only
to the value of its expropriated tangible assets, and reduced the compensable
value of the branches to $5.5 million.85 The court reasoned that, given the
nature of the Cuban economy, the Chase branches in Cuba had no reasonable
expectation of future profits and thus no going-concern value.8 6 The court of
appeals thus subtracted from the district court's calculation the discounted
present value of future profits from the branches. While recognizing the
appropriate compensation standard as a principle of customary international
law, the court reiterated that appropriate compensation and full compensation
sometimes overlap. In fact, the court viewed its valuation of $5.5 million as
constituting full compensation under the particular economic circumstances of
Cuba at that time. 7
The fourth decision arguably supporting a more flexible adequate
compensation standard was the 1982 arbitration award in Kuwait v. American
Independent Oil Co. (AMINOIL). 8 As part of a plan of progressive national-
ization of its oil industry, in 1977 the government of Kuwait expropriated the
oil exploration and production assets of AMINOIL, which had operated in that
country under an oil concession agreement since 1948.9 The concession was
to last for sixty years, after which AMINOIL's assets in Kuwait would
devolve upon the government without compensation. Kuwait's expropriation
of AMINOIL's assets, however, took place thirty-one years before the agreed
termination date of the concession. As compensation for the taking, AMIN-
OIL demanded the full going-concern value of its property - that is, the
market value of its assets and the present value of anticipated future profits.
Kuwait contended that, to the contrary, it should pay only the net book value
of AMINOL's tangible assets.9" By 1979 the parties had not negotiated a
settlement and AMINOL instituted arbitration pursuant to a more detailed
agreement executed by both parties in that year. The arbitration tribunal
included two of the most respected Western European jurists, Professor Paul
the results of past negotiated settlements in expropriation disputes should have precedential value in
adjudications. The government of Cuba argued that an independent study of negotiated settlements in
expropriation disputes revealed payments in the range of 40%-60% of actual value, and that an amount
of approximately 50% of asset value thus represented a customary international norm. For a variety of
reasons, the court held that negotiated settlements cannot create rules of customary international law. Id.
84. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
modified, 514 F. Supp. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and modified, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981), and rev'd sub
nom. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981).
85. 658 F.2d at 894.
86. Id. at 893-94.
87. Id.
88. 21 I.L.M. 976 (Reuter, Fitzmaurice & Sultan, Arbs., 1982).
89. See Derman, supra note 30, at 135.
90. 21 I.L.M. at 1031.
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Reuter and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, as well as Professor Hamed Sultan of
Kuwait.9 The arbitrators found that Kuwait's expropriatory action was a
lawful exercise of sovereignty and that the proper remedy was therefore
compensation rather than return of the concession.92 In determining the
proper compensation standard, the tribunal relied upon the "appropriate
compensation" provision in Article 4 of Resolution 1803, which, it concluded,
represented the most general formulation of the compensation standard and
"codified positive principles."'93 The arbitrators also emphasized that
appropriate compensation was best determined through a contextual, case-by-
case approach, rather than an abstract, theoretical approach.
94
A contextual approach to calculating adequate compensation requires a
determination of the "legitimate expectations" of the parties, through
examination of all the formal and informal agreements between them and their
past dealings with one another.95 Countries interested in attracting and
maintaining an inflow of foreign investment would legitimately expect to
compensate adequately for expropriated assets. However, the legitimate
expectations of foreign investors are also important. Consequently, the
tribunal concluded that an assessment of legitimate expectations could not lead
to a standard of compensation that would render foreign investments
economically useless - that is, "make nonsense of foreign investment. "'
AMINOIL and Kuwait had never agreed on specific compensation
standards in the event of expropriation, yet the tribunal found that both parties
legitimately expected that AMINOIL would receive a reasonable rate of return
on its investment. Ultimately, the tribunal determined that a reasonable rate
of return would include the depreciated replacement cost of AMINOIL's
tangible assets plus the present value of expected future profits to the end of
the concession term.97 Although the arbitrators in AMINOIL expressly
adopted a flexible "appropriate compensation" standard, they ultimately
awarded AMINOIL the equivalent of the full going-concern value of its
business. Given the tribunal's explicit recognition of a flexible "appropriate
compensation" standard as the international norm, the case should not be
interpreted as equating "appropriate" with the Hull rule. Like the Second
Circuit in Banco Nacional, the arbitral tribunal in AMINOIL simply held that
"appropriate" and "flexible" mean exactly that: under particular circumstanc-
es, a flexible attempt to ascertain appropriate compensation may lead to the
91. Reuter was appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice and served as
President of the tribunal. 21 I.L.M. at 981. Fitzmaurice was appointed by AMINOIL, and Sultan was
appointed by the government of Kuwait. Id. at 979.
92. Id. at 1017-26.
93. Id. at 1032.
94. Id. at 1033.
95. Id. at 1034.
96. Id. The arbitration tribunal in AMINOIL, like the court in Banco Nacional, refused to attach
precedential value to past negotiated settlements in expropriation disputes. Id. at 1035-36.
97. Id. at 1034-42.
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conclusion that full compensation is appropriate. Appropriate does not always
mean less than full. Under different circumstances, this arbitral tribunal might
have awarded less than full compensation.
After discussing the decisions in TOPCO, Banco Nacional, and
AMINOIL, Oscar Schachter concludes: "In view of these well-considered
opinions, a case can be made for considering that just compensation should
now be replaced by 'appropriate compensation."' 98 Former President of the
International Court of Justice Jim6nez de Ar6chaga has written that he favors
the appropriate compensation standard because "it conveys better [than 'just'
or 'adequate'] the complex circumstances which may be present in each
case."'99 He argues that the principle of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation does not represent a consensus of nations and therefore cannot
be treated as a rule of customary law.' °°
These arbitral and judicial adjudications are instructive in two ways. First,
they support the proposition that today's standard for determining compen-
sation for expropriated foreign investments is more flexible than the Hull rule.
Second, they support the position that a flexible standard, however denomi-
nated, may or may not result in less than full compensation for the investor's
loss, depending on the circumstances.
C. Actual Claims-Settlement Practices of Developing Countries
The court in Banco Nacional and the arbitral tribunal in AMINOIL
declined to treat the results of past negotiated settlements as creating rules of
customary international law. This view is undoubtedly correct from the
perspective of international lawmaking, because negotiated settlements depend
entirely too much on idiosyncratic and often confounding variables to serve
any precedential role. Still, foreign investors should be mindful of the actual
settlement practices of expropriating governments. Settlement practices reveal
patterns that ultimately may develop into customary rules of international law
through treaties, conventions, and agreements. Moreover, regardless of the
effect that actual settlement practices have on the development of international
law, a prospective foreign investor's calculation of risk should focus more on
what does happen than on what courts, arbitral tribunals, or scholars believe
should happen.
In general, developing countries have followed the practice of paying
some compensation under various negotiated or unilaterally imposed methods
of calculation, instead of compensation that developed nations would view as
98. Schachter, supra note 28, at 128.
99. Eduardo Jim~nez de Ardchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159
R.C.A.D.I. 9, 302 (1978).
100. Eduardo Jimdnez de Ar~ehaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned
Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 179, 184 (1978).
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"adequate," "full," "fair," or "just."' '1 In the early 1970s, Zouhair Kronfol
examined many of the "lump sum" expropriation settlement agreements made
since 1945 and concluded that the claimants clearly had not received prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation.' Sornarajah points out that develop-
ing countries generally prefer to decide each dispute on an ad hoc basis,
where the details of compensation depend on the host government's balancing
of the equities.0 3
Sornarajah observes that Asian states have uniformly accepted the
proposition that they pay some compensation; however, the amount often can
be relatively small because of compulsory "indigenization" statutes, which
typically require foreign investors to sell their shares of the nationalized
enterprise in the local stock market and accept the proceeds of the sale as
compensation. Because the shares must be sold within a limited period of time
and local capital is often inadequate, foreign investors are not likely to recover
the actual value of their business.'04
The experience of oil companies in India in the late 1970s and early
1980s is illustrative. In a series of legislative enactments, the Indian
government nationalized most foreign oil company assets.'0 5 Although one
Indian writer, Raj, claims that the history of nationalization in India
demonstrates a pattern of prompt and adequate compensation for appropriated
foreign assets,"° Sornarajah sees it otherwise. Sornarajah points to India's
nationalization of Burmah Shell as an example of grossly inadequate
compensation for an expropriatory action. Specifically, he observes that
India's requirement that Burmah Shell sell its shares in the extremely capital-
poor Indian domestic market precluded the company's receipt of adequate
compensation. 0 7
101. See REBECCA M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (1986).
102. ZOUHAIR A. KRONFOL, PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 118-22 (1972). For a definition
of lump sum settlements, see supra note 77. Lillich and Weston conducted a similar study of 139 lump
sum settlements between World War 11 and 1975 that revealed a general settlement range of 30%-60% of
the plausible amount of claims. RICHARD B. LILUCH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
THEIR SErrLiENTBY LUMP SuM AGREEMENTS (1975); see also Richard B. Lillich & Burns H. Weston,
Lump Sum Agreements: Their Continuing Contribution to the Law of International Claims, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 69, 78-80 (1988) (updating their study by examining an additional 29 lump sum settlements through
1987, and finding no significant difference in pattern).
103. Sornarajah, supra note 39, at 131.
104. Id. at 129. In the case of an ongoing business, "actual value" would be fall going-concern
value. See supra note 38.
105. The Indian government adopted a series of *Acquisition of Undertakings in India" Acts,
including the following: Esso (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Amendment Act of 1974, reprinted
in 1975 INDIA: CENT. ACTS, RULES, ORDINANCES & NOTIFICATIONS 49; Burmah Shell (Acquisition of
Undertakings in India) Act of 1976, Act No. 2, 1976 Curr. Indian Stat. pt. I-A, at 1; Burmah Oil Co.
(Acquisition of Shares of Oil India Ltd. and of the Undertakings in India of Assam Oil Co. Ltd. and the
Burmah Oil Co. (India Trading) Ltd.) Act of 1981, Act No. 41, 1982 Curr. Indian Stat. pt. II, at 34. RAJ,
supra note 16, at 154.
106. RAJ, supra note 16, at 190.
107. Sornarajah, supra note 39, at 129.
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In another study, after surveying compensation practices in Africa, Leslie
Rood concludes that the nations of British Africa paid less for takeovers of
foreign industry than the reasonable values owners attached to their as-
sets.' Likewise, Ingrid Detter De Lupis cites the Egyptian nationalization
of the Suez Canal's corporate owner in 1956 as an example of inadequate
compensation."' The Egyptian government promised to compensate share-
holders only after Egypt had acquired actual possession of all the company's
assets, wherever those assets were located. Egypt's action effectively froze
British assets valued at approximately $410 million and U.S. assets valued at
approximately $50 million. In 1958 the United Arab Republic (a temporary
union of Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961) relinquished all claims to the
corporation's assets outside of Egypt and agreed to pay its foreign sharehold-
ers for the present value of future profits. This compensation, along with
payment of the net value of the company's external assets, amounted to little
more than half of the actual market value of the company's shares." °
Similar examples can be found in Latin America. In 1975, Peru national-
ized the holdings of the Marcona Mining Company, a Peruvian subsidiary of
a U.S. corporation. The U.S. parent company sought compensation of nearly
$100 million, an amount that reasonably approximated actual value; however,
the Peruvian government provided only an estimated $62-75 million in
compensation."' Also illustrative is the 1973 Argentinian expropriation of
five foreign-owned banks. Chase Manhattan bank characterized the compensa-
tion provided by Argentina as "considerably below what we would consider
fair value.""'
D. Continued Vitality of the Traditional Standard
In part because the United States has continued to press for the Hull
standard of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, the formula is "by
no means dead.""' One indication that the Hull standard retains a degree
of vitality is the latest version of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States. The previous version specified in its black-letter text that
companies should pay "just compensation" for expropriated property," 4 and
108. Leslie Rood, Compensation for Takeovers in Africa, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 521, 525 (1977).
109. DE LUPIs, supra note 13, at 103.
110. The United Arab Republic paid 28.3 million British pounds (which was then equivalent to 28.4
billion French francs) to the company's foreign shareholders. The net value of company's external assets
was approximately 15.2 billion French francs. Thus, the shareholders received total compensation of
approximately 43.6 billion French francs (15.2 billion asset value plus 28.4 billion payment for present
value of future profits), which represented just over half of the actual market value of the company's
shares (81.7 billion French francs). Id. at 103-04.
111. David A. Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation and Compensation for
Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 482-86 (1977).
112. Argentina to Pay Some $25 Million for Seized Banks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1974, at 3.
113. See Clagett, Present State, supra note 14, § 12.03, at 12-9.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 185
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defined "just" in terms that were the equivalent of prompt, adequate, and
effective.115 Early drafts of the latest revision retained the "just compensa-
tion" terminology in the black-letter text, but defined the term only in a
comment and indicated that this Hull-based definition represented the U.S.
view rather than customary international law.116 Facing substantial opposi-
tion from the State Department, other concerned U.S. government agencies,
and many members of the private American bar, the drafters returned to the
language of the earlier Restatement."' The final revised version defines just
compensation as the value of the property taken (fair market value in the
absence of exceptional circumstances), and presents the standard as customary
international law rather than as just the U.S. position. 1 Thus the Restate-
ment (Third) continues to embody the Hull standard without actually using the
terms "prompt, adequate, and effective.""1 9 Despite the new Restatement's
assertion that this standard represents customary international law, the
Restatement is, after all, only an effort to capsulize American law. It is thus
not surprising to find that the new Restatement reaffirms the standard long
espoused by developed nations, and that its treatment of the issue does not
provide especially strong evidence of the Hull rule's resurrection.
A second, more substantive indication that the Hull formulation retains
substantial vitality can be found in decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
Created as part of the "Algiers Accords," under which the U.S. diplomatic
hostages in Iran were released, the Tribunal was vested with jurisdiction to
decide property-related disputes involving the governments or citizens of the
United States and Iran.12 Most of the Tribunal's work has involved hearing
expropriation claims by U.S. nationals against the government of Iran.
21
The Tribunal's three-member panels ("chambers") have adjudicated at least
eight major expropriation cases in the past decade, all of which have been
decided by a majority consisting of the American and neutral arbitrators, with
the Iranian arbitrator dissenting."1z In the first of these decisions, American
(1965).
115. Id. § 187; see Davis R. Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 AM. J. INT'L
L. 176 (1984).
116. See Robinson, supra note 115, at 176.
117. See Clagett & Poneman, supra note 38, at 36.
118. While acknowledging that the full value formulation "has met strong resistance from developing
states" in comment c, the Restatement (Third) purports to codify "[riesponsibility under general principles
of international law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 712 cmts. a & c (1987). See generally, id. cmts. a-d.
119. See Clagett & Poneman, supra note 38, at 68.
120. The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 18, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 230, 231. Despite a title indicating
that the agreement envisioned resolution only of disputes between the two governments, Article II(1) &
(2) make it clear that the tribunal's jurisdiction also includes claims by the nationals of one state against
the government of the other state. Id. at 230-3 1.
121. See Norton, supra note 80, at 483.
122. Id.
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International Group, Inc. (AIG) v. Iran, a panel of the Tribunal held that "it
is a general principle of public international law that even in a case of lawful
nationalization the former owner of the nationalized property is normally
entitled to compensation for the value of the property taken," and that the
proper measure of that value is "fair market value.., at the date of
nationalization."'" The Tribunal's subsequent decisions have essentially
followed suit and employed a standard of full going-concern value.124
We noted that the Restatement (Third) represents a purely American view
of the compensation standard. In a similar vein, the decisions of the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal could be vulnerable to a charge of American dominance
because they have all favored the American claimant over the dissent of the
Iranian arbitrator. We believe, however, that the Tribunal has served as an
impartial body applying international norms, and that its decisions constitute
more than just another manifestation of the American view. The provisions
of the agreement for forming the Tribunal were as unbiased as possible under
the circumstances." z When the Algiers Accords were negotiated, Iran
possessed a considerable amount of bargaining strength because the Carter
administration desperately needed to resolve the hostage crisis.126 Given its
leverage, Iran probably would not have agreed to establish a tribunal whose
composition or ideological disposition had been manipulated by the United
States. Further, the agreement expressly required that the Tribunal apply
established principles of commercial and international law, whether or not the
123. American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96, 105 (1983).
124. Two decisions, however, encountered difficulties with the "exceptional circumstances" exception
to the Hull rule and with methods of valuation. See Clagett, Present State, supra note 14, § 12.0314], at
12-13; Norton, supra note 80, at 482-86.
125. Article III(1) of the treaty provides:
The Tribunal shall consist of nine members or such larger multiple of three as Iran and the
United States may agree are necessary to conduct its business expeditiously. Within ninety
days after the entry into force of this agreement, each government shall appoint one-third of
the members. Within thirty days after their appointment, the members so appointed shall by
mutual agreement select the remaining third of the members and appoint one of the remaining
third President of the Tribunal. Claims may be decided by the full Tribunal or by a panel of
three members of the Tribunal as the President shall determine. Each such panel shall be
composed by the President and shall consist of one member appointed by each of the three
methods set forth above.
20 I.L.M. at 231. That is, each panel must consist of one member from the group selected by Iran, one
from the group selected by the United States, and one from the third group, the latter being neither an
Iranian nor American national.
126. During the later stages of the negotiations, Carter lost the 1980 presidential election, but his
administrationundoubtedly wanted to resolve the crisis before Reagan's inauguration, so that Reagan could
not take credit for any aspect of the hostage release. It is ironic that the agreement was signed on Carter's
last day in office, and the 52 hostages released on the day of Reagan's inauguration. See, e.g., Terence
Smith, Carter is Thwarted in Wish to Welcome 52 as President, N.Y. TamEs, Jan. 20, 1981, at A2.
Rumors circulated for years that Reagan had used George Bush as an envoy shortly before the November
1980 election to obtain the Iranians' agreement to delay release of the hostages until after the election.
Ultimately, a congressional inquiry concluded that there was no evidence to support these rumors. See Neil
A. Lewis, House Inquiry Finds No Evidence ofDeal on Hostages in 1980, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1993,
at Al.
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United States favored these principles.127 The Tribunal's panels interpreted
international law as calling for compensation of the full, going-concern value
of an appropriated business. Thus, we can characterize the decisions of the
Tribunal as representing unbiased support for the view that a standard in line
with the Hull rule remains viable.
A third indication that the Hull formulation retains some significance is
that even during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the four "anti-Hull"
adjudications took place, the principles enunciated in these adjudications were
not universally followed. To be sure, they were quite important because
adjudications dealing with questions of compensation for expropriatory acts
are relatively rare. Unlike the four adjudications previously discussed,
however, two arbitration decisions in 1979 and 1980 conducted under the
auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) indicated that full compensation is still the generally accepted
international norm. Both cases involved claims arising from Congolese
expropriation of Italian investments, with no choice-of-law clauses in any of
the relevant agreements. In the first, AGIP Co. v. People's Republic of the
Congo, the tribunal applied Congolese and international law to find that the
claimant was entitled to full asset value and lost profits."2 In the second
ICSID case, Benvenuti et Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo, the
tribunal reasoned in a similar fashion, evidently operating from the premise
that the governing standard called for an award of the full going-concern
value. "
The fourth and arguably strongest evidence of the Hull rule's viability -
and perhaps even its resurgence - is the content of relatively recent
investment protection treaties. Today there is a network of more than three
hundred bilateral investment treaties between developed and developing
nations and a number of multilateral treaties that reveal some developing
127. Article V states:
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of law
rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be
applicable, taling into account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed
circumstances.
20 I.L.M. at 232.
128. 21 I.L.M. 726, 737-39 (Trolle, Dupuy & Rouhani, Arbs., 1979). The lost-profits component
was merely nominal because the claimant had sought only nominal damages for lost profits. Id. at 737.
129. 21 I.L.M. 740, 758-61 (Trolle, Bystricky & Razafindralambo, Arbs., 1980). The tribunal
appointed an expert who attempted to calculate present value on the basis of "projected receipts," but who
ultimately concluded that the calculation was impracticable because the Congolese government had the
contractual right to fix the prices of the Italian joint venture's products. Agreeing that the present value
of future profits was too speculative to award as damages, the tribunal awarded the claimant the amount
of its investment. Id.
A third ICSID arbitration award several years later, AMCO Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia,
24 I.L.M. 1022, 1036-39 (Goldman, Foighel & Rubin, Arbs., 1984), not only began from the premise
that full going-concern value was the governing standard under both Indonesian and international law, but
actually awarded an amount reflecting such value. An ICSID committee subsequently vacated the award
on the ground that the arbitral tribunal had incorrectly applied Indonesian law, although it left undisturbed
the tribunal's analysis and application of international law. 25 I.L.M. 1441, 1464-65.
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nations' partial movement away from the position that they should have the
unilateral right to determine the amount of compensation.'30 Such treaties,
often after intense negotiation over the particular language, "typically
incorporate some or all of the traditional legal rules concerning expropriation
and compensation therefor, and provide for arbitration" or litigation of
disputes.13 ' Brice Clagett asserts that these newer investment protection
treaties help validate a principle of just compensation that is closer to the Hull
rule than what developing nations have been willing to acknowledge.3 2 He
observes, "Western European States have taken the lead in initiating and
expanding this treaty network. "133 The United States has lagged substantially
behind, however. At the time of Clagett's study just over three years ago, the
United States had concluded no BITs with developing nations, although many
developed European nations had each concluded BITs with dozens of
developing nations.'34 Only in the past year has the United States' BIT
program begun to bear real fruit, with most of the success coming in the last
several months. With a few exceptions, these new United States BITs with
developing nations have involved several nations in the former Eastern Bloc
and the former Soviet Union, as well as a handful of South American
nations.135
Clagett theorizes that several factors are responsible for what he views as
a recent resurgence of the traditional compensation standard. First, as states
develop, they find foreign investment no longer represents unjust exploitation.
They are thus less likely to view foreign businesses as fair game for
uncompensated seizure. Second, some developing countries have actually
become exporters of capital and thus are acquiring a deeper appreciation for
property rights. Finally, a growing number of developing countries recognize
that foreign investment can in fact be beneficial. As a result, according to
130. Zhuhua Shi, Guoji Guanli Yu Zhongguo Shi De Youji Jiehe - Ping 7hongwai Hezi Jingying
Qiye Fa De Xiuding [Organic Combination of International Practice and China's Condition - Comments
on theRevisedJoint Venture Law], 1991 ZHONaNAN ZHENGFAXUEYUANXUEBAo [J. MID-S. CHINA POL.
& L.C.] 36, 38; see also Clagett, Protection Under the Restatement, supra note 62, at 71-77.
131. Clagett, Present State, supra note 14, § 12.0312] at 12-10, 12-11.
132. See Brice Clagett, Just Compensation in International Law: The Issues Before the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, in 4 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31,
74-76 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1987).
133. Clagett, Present State, supra note 14, § 12.03[31 at 12-11.
134. Id.
135. On November 17, 1993, the Senate approved BITs with Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria,
Ecuador, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Romania. Also in the News, INT'L TR. REP. (BNA) 1989, 1990 (Nov.
24, 1993). On October 21, 1993, the Senate approved a BIT with Kazakhstan. Senate Ratifies U.S.-Kazakh:
Pact to Encourage, Protect Investments, 10 INT'L TR. REP. (BNA) 1821 (Oct. 27, 1993). The United
States has negotiated several other BITs with developing nations, and some of these have gotten as far as
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. For example, in August 1992, the Foreign Relations Committee
approved BITs with Russia, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and the People's
Republic of the Congo. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Backs Investment Treaties with Russia,
C.S.F.R., 9 INT'L TR. REP. (BNA) 1394, 1394-95 (Aug. 12, 1992).
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Clagett, many developing countries have moderated both their rhetoric and
their behavior.'36
Relevant judicial and arbitral adjudications, U.N. resolutions, actual
claims-settlement practices, and investment treaties leave us with no clear,
generally accepted international compensation standard for nationalized or
expropriated property, much less any specific model for computing the
amount of compensation. Nonetheless, the most recent evidence, in the form
of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, seem to indicate that
developed and developing nations are moving toward a rough consensus on
a standard that generally envisions full compensation, but allows more
flexibility in application than the traditional Hull rule.
IV. EXPROPRIATION RISK IN CHINA: THEORY, POLICY,
LAW, AND PRACTICE
After having examined the international debate over compensation for
expropriated property, we now turn to an analysis of expropriation-related risk
in China. Expropriation-related risk gives rise to more uncertainty in
investment than many foreign businesses would wish. There are, however,
signs that the degree of this uncertainty has diminished in recent times and
will continue to do so.
Admittedly, China's modern history has witnessed substantial expropria-
tion of foreign investment. This history, coupled with the negative interna-
tional perceptions created by the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and
ambiguity in China's official position, have reinforced wariness on the part
of some prospective foreign investors.
China's expropriatory actions have taken several forms, including formal
nationalization of entire economic sectors in pursuit of socialist policy,
repudiation of its predecessor government's obligations, and the retaliatory
freezing of non-Chinese assets within the country. When the People's
Republic of China was created in 1949, the Communist government
nationalized financial institutions, railroads, shipping companies, and other
industries, as well as American consular properties. 137 The new government
also refused to honor the ousted government's financial obligations. 13 The
second large expropriatory action occurred in 1950, when China froze
American assets in retaliation for America's freezing of Chinese assets after
China intervened in the Korean War. 139 Compensation to Americans for
13"6. Clagett, Present State, supra note 14, §12.02, at 12-9 to 12-10.
137. Jay S. Laifinan, Treaties and Nationalization: The People's Republic of China Experience, 11
HASTINGS INT'L CoMp. L. REV. 325, 328 (1988).
138. Id.
139. Chou En-lai, Government Administrative Council Issues Order for the Control of American
Government and Private Property in China (Dec. 28, 1950), reprinted in 1 JEROME A. COHEN &
HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DocUMENTARY STUDY 686, 687 (1974).
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their losses was delayed and inadequate. Americans asserted a total of
approximately $250 million in claims against the Chinese government. The
U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission certified nearly $197 million of
these claims as of July 6, 1972, the date for closure of the Commission's
activities relating to China."4 The Commission transmitted this certified
amount to the Secretary of State for the latter's conduct of settlement
negotiations."' 1 A settlement between the two countries was not reached
until 1979.142 Under the terms of the claims settlement, China agreed to pay
$80.5 million to the U.S. government for distribution to U.S. claimants, and
the U.S. agreed to unblock frozen Chinese assets in return.
1 43
Given the history and authoritarian political system of China, one can
never completely rule out the possibility that it will carry out expropriatory
acts in the future. We may, for example, envision political instabilities or
changes in its foreign investment policies, all of which may result in
expropriation. 1" Despite some continuing uncertainty about expropriation-
related risks in China, however, this Article suggests that recent changes in
the views of Chinese academics, and in governmental policy, law, and
practice, point toward a conclusion that these risks have diminished signifi-
cantly and are likely to continue to do so.14
A. Chinese Academic Theory
The writings of Chinese legal scholars on various subjects are important
for at least three reasons. First, because of the practical limits on expression
in China, as well as the constraints on scholars' own formative intellectual
development in its education system, these writings generally reflect the
current official thinking of China and provide much valuable insight into and
elaboration on that thinking. Second, they often shed light on some of the
fundamental philosophical differences between the participants in both
Western-Eastern and developed-developing nation dialogues. Third, China is
still in the midst of a lengthy process of developing a comprehensive legal
system to undergird economic development, and Chinese legal scholars will
surely play a role in that development.
140. Steven E. Carlson, Expropriated Property, Frozen Assets, and Sovereign Immunity: Legal
Obstacles to United States-China Trade Relations, 15 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 254, 256 (1976).
141. Id.
142. AgreementConcerning the Settlementof Claims, May 11, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 30 U.S.T. 1957.
143. Id. art. II.
144. Laifinan, supra note 137, at 329.
145. See GRTB & LIN, supra note 9, at 206.
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1. The Debate on Legislative Immunity from Expropriation
Chinese legal scholars have long debated whether China should enact a
law guaranteeing foreign enterprises immunity from expropriation. Scholars
have split into two opposing schools of thought. Understanding how the two
camps have cast the debate will help shed light on the current and future
status of Chinese expropriation legislation.
The debate first arose when the government considered economic
legislation for the special economic zones (SEZs) and open coastal cities of
China. Both schools of thought agree that in order to attract more foreign
investment, which is likely to promote long-term economic growth, legislation
concerning foreign enterprises should be explicit about China's attitude toward
foreign investment. Only a precise statement of the legal protections available
to foreign enterprises will provide prospective foreign investors with certainty
and predictability. Chinese scholars disagree, however, about the extent of
protection that should be offered to foreign investors."'
The "Traditionalist School" maintains that it is neither necessary nor
justified to provide foreign enterprises with an absolute guarantee against
nationalization. The "Immunity School" contends that absolute immunity from
nationalization for foreign investment in the SEZs and open coastal cities is
essential to attracting investment. 47 These opposing positions result from
different approaches to several issues, including national sovereignty, the
distinction between legal doctrine and economic imperatives, and China's true
place in the world order.
a. Sovereignty and Self-Restraint
The Traditionalist School maintains that a country, as a sovereign, should
be able to nationalize foreign investment within its territories in order to
protect its own public interest and uphold national independence. To restrict,
transfer, or waive China's power to deal with all relevant matters indepen-
dently would be "tantamount to tying one's own hands" under circumstances
in which any other nation would have the right to take private property for
public purposes. 4 '
146. See Chen An, Should An Immunity From Nationalization For Foreign Investment Be Enacted
in China's Economic Law?, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 39, 49 (William Tai ed., 1988). Chen, Dean of the Law School at Xiamen University, is widely
recognized within China as an expert on international law generally and, more specifically, on Chinese
law on international trade and investment and the question of expropriation and nationalization. He has
published widely on these subjects in Chinese- and English-language journals since the late 1970s. Xiamen
University lies within an SEZ, and Chen tends to have more progressive views than other Chinese
scholars.
147. Id. at 40.
148. Id.
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The Immunity School contends that, although a country has the power to
handle its internal and external affairs independently, the exercise of
sovereignty is never entirely free from constraint. Typically, rights and
obligations are reciprocal. All international agreements or treaties concluded
on the basis of equality and mutual benefit embody this principle. For
example, in 1984 China and the United Kingdom reached an agreement
providing for the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong upon
expiration of the United Kingdom's lease on July 1, 1997.1 The Chinese
Government agreed, however, that for fifty years thereafter it would not
change the current social and economic systems in Hong Kong.' This
restriction illustrates voluntary restraint in China's exercise of sovereignty.
China similarly restricts its sovereignty when it allows foreign capitalists to
make limited profits. This self-restraint is designed to help China accelerate
the growth of productive forces and modernize its economy - and thereby to
achieve greater self-development, economic efficiency, and political
independence. Self-restraint, in this case, serves to maintain and strengthen
sovereignty. Following this line of reasoning, members of the Immunity
School contend that Chinese foreign economic legislation should codify this
self-restraint, by assuring that foreign capital will not be expropriated.15'
b. The Right of Expropriation
The Traditionalist School argues that having the right to expropriate a
foreign enterprise does not necessarily translate into exercising this right. It
is extremely important, however, for a sovereign nation to possess the right
to expropriate so that it has sufficient maneuvering room if circumstances
change substantially.' 52 The Immunity School, on the other hand, contends
that China does not possess an absolute right to expropriate, because Article
18 of the Chinese Constitution provides that Chinese law protects the lawful
rights and interests of foreign investors.' 5 The right of property ownership
is the primary legal right of a foreign investor. Therefore, an absolute
immunity provision would require China to relinquish little more sovereignty
than it has already relinquished under its own constitution. A legislative
expression of immunity would simply provide further evidence of China's
determination to protect the lawful property rights of foreign businesses and
encourage them to invest actively in China.' 4
149. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26,
1984, 23 I.L.M. 1371.
150. Id. annex I, § I.
151. Chen, supra note 146, at 42.
152. Id. at 41.
153. ZHONahruA RENMiN GONGBEGUO XANFA [1982 Constitution] art. 18 [hereinafter P.R.C.
CONST., reprinted in 1 China L. for Foreign Bus. (CCH) 4-500, 4-500(6) (1988).
154. See Chen, supra note 146, at 40.
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Although the Immunity School attempts to base its argument on China's
constitutional provisions, the debate is a philosophical rather than a constitu-
tional one. The language of Article 18 is too vague and general to form the
basis for the sort of parsing to which scholars in the United States and other
Western nations are accustomed. Furthermore, China has no counterpart to
our Supreme Court capable of setting forth definitive interpretations of
ambiguous constitutional language.
55
c. China and the Third World
The Traditionalist School further argues that China, in truth, belongs to
the Third World. When dealing with major international issues, China should
remain in step with other Third World countries. Developing nations generally
consider the power to nationalize foreign enterprises important to achieving
economic independence. Most Third World countries currently take the
position that the right to expropriate foreign capital enterprises, subject to
appropriate compensation, is a central attribute of their sovereignty. A
legislative waiver of this right by China would be contrary to the fundamental
theoretical perspective and general practice of Third World countries.5 6
The Immunity School contends that even though China is a Third World
country, it is different in that most Third World countries, despite their
political independence, have not yet achieved China's level of economic
independence. Unlike many other developing countries, China is not plagued
by remnants of colonialism. Encouraging foreign investment in a controlled
and selective manner to expedite modernization of the economy would neither
lead to foreign economic domination over China nor adversely affect its
people. Thus, China's position and incentives are sufficiently different from
those of most other Third World nations that its policies should not necessarily
move in lockstep with those of other nations.5 7
2. Academic Debate on Other Issues
In addition to the basic question of whether legislation should protect
foreign investment from expropriation, Chinese legal scholars have addressed
155. Article 18 states:
The People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, other foreign economic
organizations and individual foreigners to invest in China and to enter into various forms of
economic co-operation with Chinese enterprises and other economic organizations in accor-
dance with the law of the People's Republic of China.
All foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organizations in China, as well as
joint ventures with Chinese and foreign investment located in China, shall abide by the law
of the People's Republic of China. Their lawful rights and interests are protected by the law
of the People's Republic of China.
P.R.C. CoNsTrruTioN, supra note 153, art. 18.
156. Chen, supra note 146, at 41.
157. Id. at 43.
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a number of other related expropriation issues. Their views are often
strikingly similar to those of their counterparts in the United States and other
similarly situated nations. There is general agreement, for example, that under
certain circumstances expropriation of alien property is legitimate. 58
According to the Western view of international law, a taking by a sovereign
state is legal if it is (1) for a public purpose; (2) not discriminatory; (3)
accomplished according to legal procedures, incorporating the basic elements
of due process, including the right to advance notice and an opportunity to
contest an action on its merits; and (4) compensated in a manner that comports
with some formulation of the Hull rule.159 Chinese scholars, along with the
Chinese government, accept the public purpose and nondiscrimination
principles, and essentially agree that established legal procedures are
necessary when expropriation is proposed. They have, however, a philoso-
phical view of certain issues that is quite different from that of the United
States and other developed nations. Nevertheless, the difference, in practical
terms, boils down to the question of compensation for expropriated assets.
a. The Nature of Property
Li Haopei observes that the Western theory of expropriation "is obviously
based upon the sanctity and inviolability of private property advocated by the
bourgeoisie.""' ° The Western view is, in short, "This is mine, you took it,
now pay me for it." This view has two underlying premises. The first is that
one can "own" something, that is, possess an unqualified right of exclusive
use of the thing "owned." The second is that one (including the government)
cannot take something that another "owns" without a very good reason (public
purpose) and without paying the owner compensation."' Yao argued that the
"bourgeois" notion of private property as sacred is at the root of any challenge
to the legitimacy of an expropriatory act or to the compensation offered.
162
Post-1949 China, however, does not recognize private property ownership.
People can possess and use land and other property, but they cannot own it.
State ownership of property continues today despite China's new policies
encouraging various forms of entrepreneurship: what the entrepreneur gains
under these new policies is not property ownership but a greater right to
benefit personally from more productive uses of the state's property.' 63
158. See SHAW, supra note 15, at 430.
159. Derman, supra note 30, at 131.
160. Li Haopei, Nationalization and International Law, in COHEN & CHICr, supra note 139, at 718,
720 (1974).
161. Mark A. Ferguson, Nationalization, The People's Republic of China and International Law 30
(1985) (unpublished J.D./M.A. thesis, American University) (contrasting Western and Chinese
philosophical views toward property).
162. RENATO RIBEIRO, NATIONALIZATIONOF FOREIGN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONALLAW 6 (1977).
163. The Chinese Constitution was amended in March 1988 to give certain Chinese-owned business
enterprises the power to buy and sell the right to use property. John P. Powelson, Property in Chinese
Development: Some Historical Comparisons, in ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
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These fundamental differences in the philosophical view of property help to
explain the continuing difficulty that China and the United States have had in
agreeing on compensation standards for expropriation.
b. A Question of Domestic or International Law?
Western thought on expropriation springs from conceptions of private
property ownership and the individual's consent to be subject to state action.
In contrast, the Chinese view expropriation from the perspective that state
sovereignty is part of the natural order and that state consent to international
law represents an exception to that sovereignty. Although Chinese scholars
agree that territorial sovereignty provides the basis for any right to expro-
priate, some still disagree about whether expropriation is purely an issue of
domestic law or whether it involves questions of international law. If it were
only an issue of domestic law, a nation would have the unfettered right to
determine unilaterally all issues pertaining to expropriation. On the other
hand, if it involved questions of international law, international norms would
constrain the host nation. Professor Chou Keng-sheng argues that nationaliza-
tion is "a sovereign act of a state within its territory and therefore is a
question of domestic law and not a question of international law."'64
Professor Li, however, characterizes nationalization as a public international
law question.' 65 Since Chinese scholars base the right to expropriate foreign
property on territorial sovereignty, their disagreement boils down to one about
the level of priority given to territorial sovereignty in today's interdependent
world.166 Chou views territorial sovereignty as trumping international law
considerations while Li and Yao argue that expropriation, while based on
territorial sovereignty, must still conform to the principles of public
international law.6 7
Some Chinese scholars also base the right to expropriate foreign property
on their nation's fundamental right to economic self-determination, free from
the influences of foreign capital. Such attitudes stem from the notion that a
country that was "exploited and plundered by foreign states" before its
independence has the right to regain its "national rights and interests" through
165, 172 (James A. Dom & Wang Xi eds., 1990) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA]. However,
"the ultimate ownership of land still vests in the government." Id. at 178. But see Chen Weishu,
Comment, Reforming China's Property System, in ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA, supra, at 187, 190-91;
see also Susan Young, Wealth But Not Security. Attitudes Towards Private Business in the 1980s, in
ECONOMIC REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CHINA 63, 77 (Andrew Watson ed., 1992)
164. Chou Keng-sheng et al., The Legal Basis for the Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company,
in COHEN & CHIU, supra note 139, at 730.
165. See Li, supra note 160, at 719.
166. See Ferguson, supra note 161, at 19 (comparing views of Chinese scholars).
167. Id.
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expropriation. 6 ' Yao also claims that international law sanctions nationaliza-
tion in order to free a country from domination by foreign capital.1
69
The practical effect of these varying philosophical viewpoints on the basic
nature of the right to expropriate remains to be seen. The existence of a
scholarly dispute means, of course, that the nation's future leadership will be
able to find jurisprudential support regardless of the stance it takes, so long
as that stance remains faithful to the fundamental principles on which scholars
do agree.
c. The Nondiscrimination Principle
Developed nations have long viewed takings of property that single out
foreigners in general, or foreigners of a particular nationality or other
grouping, as contrary to international law. 70 Chinese writers essentially
accept this position by supporting the so called "Calvo doctrine," named after
an early Argentinean jurist and statesman. This doctrine posits that in entering
a host country, foreign investors agree not to invoke the assistance of their
own nation to obtain special treatment.' This principle emerged from the
lessons of nineteenth-century South America, when certain foreign investors
used their nations' diplomatic and even military influence to secure preferred
treatment. 1
72
Yao observes that this doctrine is based on the notion that a foreign
business constructively consents to be treated in the same manner as a
country's nationals by investing there." Thus, foreign investors cannot
expect to receive better treatment than nationals. 74 Chen emphasizes that
this equal treatment principle extends to the subordination of private to public
interests in China, whether those private interests are held by Chinese citizens
or foreigners."' 5 Most Chinese writers reject the contrary view - that aliens
deserve better treatment than nationals - as "imperialist and colonialist,
although some believe that China should grant foreign investors in the SEZs
and open costal cities special treatment."' 76 On balance, however, the
Chinese view of the nondiscrimination principle is essentially the same as the
Western view.
168. GUOJIFA [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 424 (Wand Tieya & Wei Min eds., 6th ed. 1987).
169. See Yao Meizhen, Guoji Touzi de Fala Baohu [Legal Protection of International Investment],
in 1982 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 140.
170. See 2 RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
(1987).
171. Id. at 168.
172. HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 553 (1986).
173. See Yao, supra note 169, at 133-34.
174. See Li, supra note 160, at 728; Chen, supra note 146, at 50.
175. See Chen, supra note 146, at 50.
176. Yao, supra note 169, at 134. In actual practice, however, the Chinese government's efforts to
attract foreign investors have included some limited preferences for foreign investment over Chinese state-
owned enterprises, such as a lower income tax rate. See infra text accompanying notes 232 & 259 to 260.
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d. The Compensation Standard
As previously noted, Western authorities, in the United States in
particular, often assert that international law requires prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation for expropriation. A number of bilateral investment
treaties also contain this standard." One American commentator has
captured the Western position especially well, stating, "Recognition of the
obligation to pay compensation can be meaningless if the valuation of
nationalized property does not compensate an investor for his book value plus
a portion of his legitimately anticipated future profits."' 7
Chinese legal writers all reject "prompt, adequate, and effective" as the
customary international legal standard of compensation for expropriated
investments. Professor Chen, for example, maintains that under the compensa-
tion principles advocated by the United States, claims were usually excessive
and would have abrogated the sovereign right of expropriation if satisfied.'79
He further states that developing countries believe they need to compensate
expropriations only to the extent that their national laws require. Because of
the huge profits already amassed by foreign investors since the beginning of
the colonial period and the weak financial position of the host countries,
developing countries need flexible compensation standards to maintain their
political and economic sovereignty. Chen concludes that the dispute over the
compensation standard is really a dispute over the right of poor countries to
take over foreign investment when necessary; it is nothing more than an
extension of the longstanding rhetorical battle over the existence of the right
to expropriate.80
While most Chinese legal scholars know which compensation standard
they wish to reject, they disagree over which standard of compensation China
should adopt. Some have-advocated no compensation at all, an unrealistic
position if China wishes to attract any foreign investment. Even the Chinese
government has completely abandoned this position.' Others, like Li,
argue that the nationalizing state's only obligation is not to discriminate. If the
government would not compensate nationals for a taking, the state has no
obligation to compensate foreigners"2 Scholars have rarely expressed such
extreme positions in recent years. This development reflects the unrealistic
nature of these views in a global economy as well as the changing attitude of
China's leadership. Most scholars espouse views consistent with those of other
developing nations interested in attracting foreign capital and encouraging
freer trade. As one Chinese commentator has suggested, "[A]ppropriate
177. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 115, at 176, 178.
178. Derman, supra note 30, at 131.
179. Chen, supra note 146, at 45.
180. Id.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 188 & 190 to 192.
182. Li, supra note 160, at 722.
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compensation has become a principle and custom of contemporary interna-
tional law and it is supported by most nations and international legal scholar-
ship." 83 Still, Chinese writers have not fully embraced the U.S. position on
the issue of compensation. They are unlikely to do so in the near future,
especially if the U.S. formulation continues to be couched in the traditional
terms of the Hull rule.
B. China's Expressions of Government Policy
Policy is not made or communicated in China as it is in the West.
Although China is attempting to build a structure of policy and law in order
to modernize its economy, it does not have a tradition of formality in
policymaking or lawmaking. Rather, China has the tradition of an authori-
tarian state, where communication and formality in policymaking is not the
norm. For example, a change in policy is often simply communicated in a
speech, with the typewritten text passed out to reporters and published in
newspapers or magazines. Thus, policy pronouncements concerning justifiable
circumstances for expropriation and the appropriate standard for compensation
are typically very informal, even though all of these statements are made by
high-ranking officials who have the authority to speak for the government.'84
1. Justifications for Expropriatory Actions
The Chinese government, after considering whether to grant absolute
immunity from expropriation in its SEZs and open coastal cities, has
maintained the position that nationalization is a sovereign right that must be
retained but never abused. Thus, even in these special areas of the country,
Chinese legislation permits nationalization when necessary. 185 As Chen has
observed, this approach is not inconsistent with the approach of developed
countries, where "private properties have never been absolutely free from
expropriation or nationalisation."" 6 Looking back two hundred years, for
example, Chen points out that although the Declaration of Human Rights
resulting from the French Revolution elevated private property ownership to
the same level as personal liberties by characterizing property rights as
"sacred and inviolable," the same document also recognized the right of the
sovereign to take private property for a public purpose upon payment of
183. Yao, supra note 169, at 142; see also Wang, Appropriate Compensation, supra note 43, at 13-
18 (arguing that appropriate compensation is both customary international standard and Chinese rule).
184. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 189. Unfortunately, this informality in policy formation
makes many of the original sources inaccessible to those outside China, and sometimes even to scholars
within China. Scholars often must rely upon secondary sources to a greater extent than in other nations.
See, e.g., sources cited in infra notes 190, 192, 195 & 197.
185. See Chen, supra note 146, at 51.
186. Id.
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"equitable" compensation. 1 7 In the United States and other Western nations,
the same principle applies: private property may be taken upon payment of
compensation that is labeled and calculated in somewhat different ways in
different countries. He notes that Western nations have taken entire residential
or industrial sections for the construction of highways, railways, utility plants,
military facilities, and other endeavors linked to the public interest, subject to
the payment of compensation. It would be strange, indeed, Chen argues, for
China to deny itself the power of eminent domain in its SEZs and open coastal
cities and then to grant foreign investors property rights more extensive than
those they possess in their home countries.'
Many foreign scholars and business practitioners have argued that the
investment climate in Asia and the Pacific rim will be extremely favorable in
the coming decades. Moreover, they view China as leading the way because
of its rapidly developing economy, living standards, and increasing demand
for consumer goods and technology.' 89 Moreover, on several occasions
Chinese leaders have publicly assured prospective foreign investors that
China's modern expropriation policy should pose no major concern for them.
Perhaps the most important official government pronouncement regarding
expropriation policy was made during the 1982 China Investment Promotion
Conference. 9 At the conference, China's Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade issued a document that attempted to address forty-four
categories of questions posed by foreign investors. The fourth category
included questions relating to (a) the existence of meaningful assurances that
foreign capital in China would be safe, (b) the circumstances under which
expropriation might occur, and (c) the extent of compensation, if any, in the
event of expropriation.19" ' To these questions the ministry answered:
Under normal circumstances, the Chinese government will not resort to the practice of
expropriation of the properties belonging to foreign investors in China. If such expropriation
should become necessary as a result of an event of force majeure or for the public interest,
China would act by due process of law and would give reasonable compensation."'
187. Id.
188. Id. at 50-51. Even if one focuses solely on the exercise of eminent domain in the United States,
where one term - "just compensation" - is the constitutional norm, methods of calculation are disparate.
The sheer number of legal challenges by dispossessed property owners provides substantial evidence that
they often feel inadequately compensated by their own government. See, e.g., JOHN E. NoWAY, ET AL.,
CONSTTUrrIONAL LAW § 11.14 (3d ed. 1986).
189. Gu Ming, Investment Environment Seen as Favourable, BEmNG REv., July 16, 1984, at 16,
17 [hereinafter Gu, Investment Environment]. Mr. Gu was Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council
at that time. The position of Secretary-General is similar to that of the President's Chief of Staff in the
United States, and is just below the premier and vice premier. A legal expert, Mr. Gu spoke with the full
authority of the Chinese government in the Beying Review.
190. The Conference was organized in Guangzhou by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade in conjunction with the Industrial Development Organization of the United Nations. Chen, supra
note 146, at 51.
191. Id. at 47.
192. Full Explanations by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of China on the
Question of Foreign Investment in China, CHINA ECON. NEWS (Hong Kong), Supp. No. 3, May 12, 1982,
at 12, cited in Chen, supra note 146, at 51.
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Most other nations likewise follow this public purpose requirement for valid
nationalizations. Even in the freest of nations, public interests sometimes
transcend private interests. Where the two interests directly conflict, a private
interest must be subordinated to the public interest. If the private interest is
substantially devalued as a consequence of this subordination, the state
provides the private owner with reasonable compensation according to
established legal standards.
Chinese policy apparently construes the term force majeure to describe
an event or natural disaster that suddenly requires the subordination of certain
private property interests to the public interest.193 If, for instance, China
were to go to war, the government may need to take over enterprises operated
by foreign investors in strategic industries such as petroleum refining.
Similarly, in the event of a natural disaster, the Chinese government might
find it necessary to take over those foreign enterprises whose operations relate
closely to emergency relief requirements.194
Also at the 1982 conference, which was essentially a vehicle for
publicizing the post-Mao open-door policy, the Vice Minister of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade stated that, except in the case of a true
emergency (force majeure), the government would not even consider
expropriatory actions unless foreign investors violated Chinese law or
otherwise acted in ways that substantially undermined Chinese national
interests or public order.'95 Even if foreign investment were to be expropri-
ated because of force majeure, the government would act with due process of
law and provide equitable and reasonable compensation. 96
2. Compensation for Expropriated Investments
Gu Ming, Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council, set forth
China's official policy on compensation for expropriatory actions in 1984.
According to Gu, China "must abide by" the appropriate compensation
standard because a 1974 U.N. resolution, a source of customary international
law, 97 incorporates that standard.' 9s Elaborating on the term "appropriate
compensation," for example, he stated that "the compensation shall be paid
according to legal procedures," that the method of payment must be
"convertible and freely transferable," and that payment must be made "without
193. Chen, supra note 146, at 51.
194. Id.
195. Wei Yuming, China's Policy on Absorption of Direct Investment from Foreign Countries,
BElIING REV., July 26, 1982, at 18, 20 (address before China Investment Promotion meeting in
Guangzhou); see also Chen, supra note 146, at 51-52.
196. Wei, supra note 195, at 18, 20.
197. Gu Ming, Concerning Investment Protection Accords, BEIUING REV., July 16, 1984, at 19
[hereinafter Gu, Concerning Investment].
198. See supra part III.A.
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delay unless with justified reasons." '199 With these elaborations, the Chinese
version of appropriate compensation seems quite close to the "adequate,
prompt, and effective" standard. An American writer, Jay Laifman, observes
that no meaningful distinction exists between "appropriate" as elaborated by
this Chinese policy pronouncement and "adequate." Indeed, both standards are
quite vague and provide no principled formulation for determining the amount
of compensation.' Laifman also notes that the phrase "without delay unless
with justified reasons" is synonymous with the term "prompt," and that the
phrase "convertible and fully transferable" is the functional equivalent of the
term "effective" and is even preferable because of its greater clarity.20 1
Gu's statements suggest that China may no longer equate the term
"appropriate" with partial payment, but rather with a standard that is close to
the Hull rule. .China's recent recognition of its need to create a low-risk
environment for foreign investment explains this change in approach. China's
view during the 1950s and 1960s that the expropriation of property required
no compensation reflected its "closed door" policy of economic self-suffi-
ciency. Its current expropriation policy, on the other hand, reflects the "open
door" economic policy that China began to develop in the 1970s and to which
it formally committed in the 1980s.2 °2
Although Gu's interpretation of China's appropriate compensation policy
may have been designed more as a public relations maneuver than an
announcement of any substantive policy change, the same can probably be
said about the longstanding U.S. insistence on the prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation standard in all of its relevant communications. China
wanted its newly announced compensation policy to reassure prospective
foreign investors that it will not nationalize foreign property, and that if it
must do so, it will fairly compensate the property owner.203
Recent Chinese government policy statements concerning expropriation
and compensation should encourage the tentative foreign investor for at least
two reasons. First, although these statements are carefully framed to convey
that the government still controls the economy, they also exhibit a moderate,
reform-oriented tone. This tone is intended to signal that China will do what
it takes to attract and retain enough foreign investment to support its drive
toward economic modernization. Second, even though policy pronouncements
are much less formal in China than in the West, they are still the most reliable
sources of information about social and economic policy in an authoritarian
system like China's.
199. Gu, Concerning Investment, supra note 197, at 19.
200. Laifnan, supra note 137, at 344.
201. Id.
202. See Ferguson, supra note 161, at 26.
203. Id.
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C. The Chinese Legal Structure
Despite assurances by government officials that China intends to
expropriate only in extraordinary circumstances, and to compensate fairly in
such an event, many prospective foreign investors continue to shy away from
substantial investments in the Chinese economy. The highly fluid and
continually disputed nature of expropriation law in the modern international
community has undoubtedly contributed to this reluctance.2 China has
found it particularly difficult to overcome these problems because, when it
first adopted an open-door policy to encourage foreign investment, China
lacked a legal framework capable of adequately protecting the interests of
foreign investors. Many prospective investors undoubtedly would like special
legislation of the type supported by proponents of the Immunity School to
protect their interests. Chinese officials who oppose such legislation have
pointed out, however, that even when China lacked adequate legal protection
for foreign investors, it continued to honor economic commitments in the
international community. °"
Recognizing that foreign investors need the assurance and predictability
of formal legal structures before they commit large resources, since 1979 the
Chinese government has enacted over one hundred laws and regulations
pertaining to foreign economic affairs." As China's foreign economic
dealings grow, these laws will have to be refined and better integrated.
Presumably, these laws will also become more accessible to investors, as
Chinese collections of laws are made available for translation to commercial
publishers and electronic data bases for worldwide distribution. Until then,
potential investors must attempt to better understand the fundamental changes
in China's legal framework, including its new constitution, its most important
legislative enactments relating to foreign economic matters, and its treatment
of treaties and other sources of international law.
1. The New Constitution
If adhered to in practice, a constitutional guarantee is the most powerful
of all legal assurances. No other law, regulation, or decree may lawfully
conflict with the Constitution. In 1982, the Chinese government substantially
rewrote its constitution and expanded the guarantees it contained. One of the
main goals of the revision was to open up the country so that it might become
a major participant in the world economic community.2" Article 18 of the
Constitution permits foreign enterprises, economic organizations, and
204. See Henry & Bainbridge, supra note 29, at 996.
205. See Gu, Investment Environment, supra note 189, at 16.
206. Cheng Jing, Duonian Touru, Jinzhao Jianxiao [Input for Years Produces Favorable Results],
RENMIN RIBAO [PEoPLE'S DAILY (OvERsEAs EDrIoN)l, Jan. 24, 1992, at 1.
207. P.R.C. CONST., supra note 153, pmbl.
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individual entrepreneurs to invest in China and to form various alliances with
Chinese counterparts.2"5 The same provision also protects the lawful rights
and interests of foreign investors as long as they act in accordance with
Chinese law.2'
The 1982 Constitution grants a foreign citizen or business property rights
only, not political rights or freedoms. Likewise, foreign nationals or
enterprises have certain civil obligations in connection with their economic
activities, such as fulfilling contractual commitments, paying taxes, and
observing other applicable Chinese laws. Foreigners and Chinese citizens
enjoy the same rights with respect to proprietary interests in patents,
copyrights, and most other kinds of property. Since foreign investors are most
concerned with property rights, they should view the new Constitution's
provisions regarding such rights as a significant step toward a guarantee of
stability.
The 1982 Constitution does not, however, guarantee that the government
will never seize foreign property interests. As noted earlier, property owners
rarely, if ever, enjoy absolute freedom from seizure in their own countries.
The Constitution provides that Chinese citizens may not infringe upon the
public interest in exercising their rights, including the right to own prop-
erty.21 0 Article 10 states, "The state may in the public interest take over land
for its use in accordance with the law." 11 Although this provision purports
to deal only with the property of Chinese nationals, China's position that the
Constitution applies to all those within its borders would necessarily extend
this "public interest" requirement to foreign-owned property.21 2 Moreover,
although Article 10 refers only to land, the requirement that the government
only take private property as necessary for the public interest should also
apply to other forms of property. After all, the main reason for adopting the
new constitution was to create a foundation for economic reform, much of
which depends on foreign investment; the predominant assets of a foreign
investor will typically not take the form of an ownership interest in Chinese
land, even in the Chinese sense of "ownership. "213 Even if a public interest
208. Id. art. 18.
209. Id.
210. Id. art. 51.
211. Id. art. 10.
212. See, e.g., id. pmbl. ("The people of all nationalities, all state organs, the armed forces, all
political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings in the country must take the
Constitution as the basic norm of conduct, and they have the duty to uphold the dignity of the Constitution
and ensure its implementation.').
213. A foreign investor's assets are more likely to take the form of structures, equipment, inventory,
teclmology, and perhaps some form of real property lease. In any event, the Chinese concept of land
ownership is the ownership of the right to use it; the state ultimately owns the land itself. If, as most signs
indicate, one of the Chinese government's primary purposes in adopting a new constitution was to make
foreign investment more attractive, it would be counterintuitive to suppose that no public interest
requirement would apply to an expropriation of foreign-owned assets other than land.
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requirement applies to all forms of property, however, what constitutes a valid
public interest is as vague in China as it is in the Western world.214
2. Legislative Enactments
Of the more than one hundred laws passed since 1979 dealing with
foreign economic affairs, two speak directly to the expropriation issue: the
Joint Venture Law' and the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law.21a
When taken together with other signals of the Chinese government, these laws
suggest that China is developing a more favorable climate for foreign
investment.
The National People's Congress enacted the country's first Law on
Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures in July 1979, only seven months after the
Communist Party Central Committee established the open-door policy. The
first version of the Joint Venture Law addressed the expropriation issue only
vaguely, stating in Article 2, "The Chinese government protects, by the
legislation in force, the resources invested by a foreign participant in a joint
venture and the profits due him pursuant to the agreements, contracts and
articles of association authorized by the Chinese Government as well as his
other lawful rights and interests. '217 The law left unclear the contemplated
circumstances of expropriation as well as the nature and extent of compensa-
tion for expropriated properties.
The 1990 revision of the Joint Venture Law addressed the expropriation
question more directly. Article 2 now includes a separate paragraph stating,
"The State shall not nationalise or expropriate enterprises with sole foreign
investment but in special circumstances .... [W]here it is necessary to the
public interest, an enterprise with sole foreign investment may be expropriated
in accordance with legal procedures, and appropriate compensation paid. "218
Article 5 of the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law states, "Except under
special circumstances, the State shall not nationalize or expropriate wholly-
owned foreign enterprises. Should it prove necessary to do so in the public
interest, legal procedures will be followed and reasonable compensation will
be made."219
214. Ferguson, supra note 161, at 21.
215. Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment
(1979) [hereinafter Joint Venture Law], reprinted in 1 ZHONGHuA RENMIN GONGHEGUO DUIWAI JINni
FAGUI -uBIAN [COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CONCERNING FOREIGN ECoNOMIc AFFAIRs] 41 (1985) [hereinafter COLLECTION OF LAWS]; see also
Renda Shenyi Hezi Fa Xiuzheng An [The People's Congress Considers the Revised Joint Venture Law],
PEOPLE'S DAILY, March 20, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Revised Joint Venture Law].
216. Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Enterprises with Sole Foreign Investment
(1986), reprinted in 2 CHNmA L. FOR FOREIGN Bus. (CCH) 13,506 (1993) [hereinafter Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprise Law].
217. Joint Venture Law, supra note 215, art. 2.
218. See Revised Joint Venture Law, supra note 215.
219. Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law, supra note 216, 13,506.
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The revised Article 2 of the Joint Venture Law and Article 5 of the
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law provide more concrete guidance on
expropriation than previously existed in China. The terms of these two
provisions, however, remain less than precise. There is no attempt in the
legislation itself to define "special circumstances," "public interest,"
"appropriate compensation," or "reasonable compensation." Nevertheless, the
two provisions formally codify the principle that the government is to
expropriate a foreign enterprise only under exceptional circumstances and that
the government must pay meaningful compensation. The essential message of
the legislation seems to be that China will expropriate only under circum-
stances that Western nations traditionally consider justifiable and, then, pay
compensation in an amount it deems fair. This message comes across more
clearly when one reads the legislation alongside relevant constitutional
provisions, policy pronouncements, and the various signals that indicate China
officially desires a substantial infusion of foreign capital. Even with all of
these new assurances, the methodology for determining compensation is still
indeterminate. If full asset value, including the present value of future profits,
is to be the standard, will the starting point for calculation be value to the
Chinese, value to the investor, or some type of external market-value
benchmark? These unresolved issues, however, should not discourage
investment in China. The answers to these questions are no less certain in
China than in many other developing nations; in fact, they are probably more
certain.
3. Application of International Law and Practice
Several recent legal developments indicate that China is becoming
increasingly amenable to adhering to norms of customary international law
and practice. Although these developments do not specifically involve
expropriation issues, they certainly are relevant to an overall assessment of
expropriation risk. The more a nation comes to respect international legal
order in any context, the less likely it is to deviate from international norms
in the specific context of compensation for expropriatory actions.
The 1985 Foreign Economic Contract Law, which applies to all contracts
between Chinese and foreign entities except international transport contracts,
provides significant evidence that China is willing to subordinate some of its
own sovereignty to international legal norms in order to participate in the
global economy? 0 Article 5 provides that the contracting parties may
choose the law to be applied in disputes that might arise from the contract. In
the absence of such a choice-of-law clause, the law of the jurisdiction having
220. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shewai Jingii Hetong Fa [Foreign Economic Contract Law] art.
1 (1985), reprinted in ZHONGGUO SHEWAI JINGJI FAGIi HumiAN 1949-1985 [CoLLECTION OF CHINA'S
FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAWS 1949-1985] 1205 (1986) [hereinafter FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAWS].
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the closest connection with the contract applies. The second paragraph of
Article 5 specifies, however, that Chinese law governs contracts for Chinese-
foreign equity joint ventures, Chinese-foreign cooperative enterprises, and
Chinese-foreign cooperative exploitation and development of natural
resources. In the event that there is no relevant provision of Chinese law, the
third paragraph provides that "international practice may apply.""1
It is noteworthy that China formally recognizes the validity of "interna-
tional practice" and provides for its application, in the absence of Chinese
law, even to the three enumerated contract types performed within China.
Nevertheless, Article 5's provision that "international practice may apply"
when Chinese law is silent on a relevant point, does not send to foreign
investors a definitive signal of China's commitment to participate fully in the
world community - a commitment that the word "shall" would have
unambiguously conveyed. Still, this portion of Article 5 codifies a principle
that occasionally had been followed in investment contracts with Chinese firms
(particularly offshore petroleum development contracts), which allowed parties
to invoke precedents created by international practice in the event of a
dispute.
tm
International practice refers to the principles, rules, and dispute resolution
mechanisms that govern international investment, management of international
business enterprises, and adjustment of economic relationships in the
international business community. Settlement of disputes through arbitration
is one example of an international practice accepted by China. Article 37 of
the Foreign Economic Contract Law, for example, provides that any
contractual dispute between Chinese and foreign entities should be resolved
by party-to-party negotiation or through the use of mediation. If the parties are
unwilling or unable to settle their dispute, they may resort to binding
arbitration as provided by the arbitration clause in their contract or an
arbitration agreement made after the dispute arises.' Moreover, they may
submit the dispute "to a Chinese arbitration body or other arbitration body."
This provision indicates that the government views international arbitration
tribunals and their awards to be valid in China. 24 Similarly, the Regulations
Concerning Joint Offshore Oil Exploitation state, "Mediation and arbitration
may be conducted by an arbitration body of the People's Republic of China,
or the parties to the contract may agree upon arbitration by another arbitration
body."' The Joint Venture Law includes a nearly identical provision.226
221. Id. art. 5.
222. Jerome A. Cohen, The New Foreign Contract Law, ClINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 52
[hereinafter Cohen, New Law].
223. Foreign Economic Contract Law, art. 37.
224. Id. (emphasis added). If a dispute is not resolved by negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, suit
may be brought by either party in People's Court. Id. art. 38.
225. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Hezuo Kaicai Haiyang Shiyou Ziyuan Tiaoli [Regulations
Concerning Joint Offshore Oil Exploitation] art. 27, Jan. 30, 1982, reprinted in FOREIGN ECONOMIC
LAWS, supra note 220, at 889, 894.
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Chinese government officials have augmented legislative provisions
calling for the application of international norms in the absence of Chinese
law by offering their own assurances that they will enforce the letter of the
law. 7 Because it is frequently difficult to ascertain the applicable Chinese
law on a particular subject, however, investors cannot be sure whether
international law applies or whether they have simply failed to discover the
applicable Chinese law. Thus, legislative provisions in combination with the
assurances of Chinese officials do not definitively determine the law to be
applied in any given situation." Moreover, we still do not know what
China's position would be in the event of a true conflict of laws. Such a
conflict would occur when a Chinese law in fact could apply, but legitimate
choice-of-law principles - either created by agreement or found in the choice-
of-law rules of another country with a close connection to the dispute - call
for application of a provision of another nation's law that conflicts with the
relevant Chinese law. Either additional Chinese legislation or regulations, or
decisions made on a case-by-case basis, will have to address these questions.
Leaving the resolution to future ad hoe determination is, however, unlikely to
quiet the fears of foreign investors.
Whether investors can assume that China will apply international law
when no Chinese law is available remains uncertain. China may, rather than
submit to international law, create a new domestic law or policy. In other
words, if international law currently applies because of a void in Chinese law,
will China later upset the reasonable investment-backed expectations of
foreign investors by filling the void with a Chinese law substantially different
from the relevant international norm? If, in such an event, the effect on a
foreign investor is serious enough, the measure could constitute an expropria-
tory act. Other countries have used such tactics for the sole purpose of
limiting the rights of a foreign investor. 9
On several occasions, Chinese government officials have sought to
assuage investors' fears that China might undermine their reasonable
expectations by subsequent laws or regulations. While China adheres to the
principle that newer laws prevail over older ones, a foreign investor whose
contract is undermined by a change in law may petition the Chinese
government for an exemption from the law's application to the contract.
Although the government is not required by any current law to respond
positively to such a petition, the government has followed an informal policy
to do so. In 1982, Wei Yuming, Vice-Minister of Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade, announced that once the contracts signed by Chinese and foreign
firms are approved by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
226. Joint Venture Law, art. 14.
227. See Laifman, supra note 137, at 337 (citing Wei Jiaju, Law on Economic Contracts Involving
Foreign Interests, 3 CHiNA L. REP. 166, 167 (1986)).
228. Id. at 337.
229. Id. (citing DE Lupis, supra note 13, at 27-29).
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or its authorized institutions, the contracts themselves bind both sides. If,
however, the contracts' provisions conflict with new laws and regulations
issued by the Chinese government after the approval of the contracts, Wei
stated that "common international practices will be followed. '""O Although
the original contracts would be subject to new laws and regulations, "those
conflicting parts of the original contracts could be dealt with in accordance
with the stipulations in the original contracts through mutual consultation and
confirmation." 1 For example, the Ministry of Finance takes the position
that tax provisions favorable to foreigners in existing contracts should survive
new tax legislation. This precedent, however, could be set aside at any
time. 2 Indeed, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade,
which approves investment contracts, has consistently rejected draft contract
language protecting foreign investors from the effects of subsequent
legislation. It has thus retained its power to determine the issue on a case-by-
case basis.233
The 1985 Foreign Economic Contract Law offers foreign investors their
first legislatively based promise that subsequent changes in the law will not
undermine contract rights and investments. Article 40 provides that contracts
for Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, cooperative enterprises, and natural
resource development projects "may still be implemented according to the
provisions of those contracts" if a new law conflicts with the contractual
terms. 4 Jerome Cohen cautions, however, that neither implementing
regulations nor authoritative interpretations have clarified the meaning of this
phrase. Article 40's use of the word "may" perpetuates uncertainty about
China's commitment; as Cohen argues, few investors will find a legislative
provision granting Chinese officials discretion to decide whether to apply
subsequent law to existing contracts very reassuring." Regardless of how
it is interpreted, Cohen emphasizes that Article 40 does not protect other long-
term contracts, such as arrangements for the licensing of technology,
compensation trade,26 or wholly foreign-owned investments. 7 These
arrangements are functionally equivalent to the equity joint ventures and
cooperative enterprises protected by Article 40. Thus, foreign companies
would welcome an amendment of Article 40 to cover all such transac-
tions.28
230. Wei, supra note 195, at 20.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Cohen, New Law, supra note 222, at 52.
234. Foreign Economic Contract Law, art. 40.
235. Cohen, NewLaw, supra note 222, at 53; see also Jerome A. Cohen, An American Perspective
on China's Legislative Problems, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr., 1988, 6, 7 [hereinafter Cohen, American
Perspective] (characterizing Article 40 as prime example of ambiguous drafting).
236. Compensation trade involves long-term arrangements based on barter, as opposed to currency,
payment.
237. Cohen, American Perspective, supra note 235, at 7.
238. Id.
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D. Practice: Treaties in the Chinese System
1. The Status of Treaties in Chinese Law
We have previously noted that treaties, particularly the network of BITs
concluded in recent years, are an important element of the investment risk
calculus."9 Much of the impetus for signing these treaties is found in the
continuing uncertainty over various expropriation issues.2"
China neither signed nor ratified the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties,24 which was the product of twenty years' work by the U.N.
International Law Commission. The Convention codifies customary interna-
tional law principles pertaining to the effect and interpretation of treaties.242
China's failure to assent to the Convention creates obvious questions about
China's attitude toward the legitimacy of treaties as a source of positive
international law,243 and the relationship between treaties and Chinese
domestic law. For answers, one may look to several sources, including the
writings of Chinese legal scholars, applicable Chinese laws, and actual
Chinese practice.
China has not yet drafted a comprehensive code of private international
law separate from its other laws. As a result, its conflict-of-law rules
concerning the status of treaties in Chinese domestic laws are scattered among
a number of laws and regulations, including the Code of Civil Procedure and
the General Principles of Civil Law.2 " China's Code of Civil Procedure
stipulates that, where China is a party to an international treaty or convention
containing provisions that conflict with Chinese domestic laws, the pertinent
treaty or convention rules shall apply. However, when China agrees to a
treaty it may declare its reservation to any specific provisions, over which
Chinese law will then prevail.245 Similarly, the General Principles of Civil
Law provide that treaty law shall prevail over Chinese civil law if the two
conflict, unless the treaty provision in question was the subject of an express
239. See supra text accompanying notes 130 to 135.
240. WALLACE, supra note 101, at 197.
241. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679; see Chiu Hungdah, Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era,
1978-1987, 21 INT'L LAW. 1127, 1158 (1987). Professor Chiu is one of the leading Chinese legal scholars
based in the United States.
242. See WALLACE, supra note 101, at 196; see also RICHARD A. BILDER, MANAGING THE RisKs
OF INTERNATIONAL AGREFMENT 5 (1981).
243. Professor Chiu observes, however, that Chinese treatise writers generally agree that treaties are
the most important source of international law, and that this position does not differ in any meaningful way
from that of Western writers. Chiu Hungdah, Chinese Views on Sources of International Law, 28 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 289, 295 (1987).
244. See Zheng Zhaohuang, The Judicial Resolutions of Foreign Investment Disputes Before the
Chinese People's Courts: A Study of the Questions of Jurisdiction and Applicable Law, 23 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 719, 720 (1987).
245. Code of Civ. Proc. of the P.R.C. (Trial Implementation), art. 238 (1982), reprinted in 3 CHINA
L. FOR FOREIGN Bus. (CCH) 23,975 (1993).
19941
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:135
reservation by China. The Foreign Economic Contract Law contains an almost
identical provision.2 Two Chinese writers have suggested, however, that
treaty provisions should not prevail over China's Constitution.247
2. China's Position on Expropriation in Its Bilateral Investment Treaties
When prospective foreign investors know that their investments will be
protected by a treaty, and that the host government has a history of fully
implementing and honoring its treaty obligations, the investment environment
becomes dramatically more attractive. Bilateral investment treaties typically
address the various issues relating to expropriations.248 There are basically
two types of bilateral treaties: Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties
(FCNs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). FCN treaties, many of
which were adopted during the decade after World War II, establish in very
broad terms the conditions under which the governments and nationals of two
countries will conduct commercial relations.249 BITs, the newer form of
agreement, usually protect economic interests more broadly and include
clearer terms than FCNs. The United States considers BITs to be the
prototype for future treaties and as a replacement for the older FCN
treaties."50 BITs, which the Chinese call "international investment protection
agreements," aim primarily to identify, clarify, and protect the interests of
each nation's investors."' Thus far, China has executed BITs covering many
issues, including reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment, expropriation-
related issues, repatriation of profits and principal, and dispute resolution5 2
China has signed BITs with fifty-two countries.3 Without exception,
these BITs recognize that the host country has the sovereign right to
expropriate foreign property within its territory for a public purpose. Although
they sometimes use different terms, the provisions are identical in substance.
When one contracting state must, for a public purpose, expropriate invest-
ments made by entities of the other contracting state, the expropriating nation
has a binding obligation to pay convertible, freely transferable forms of
compensation according to established legal procedures. For example, the
China-Denmark BIT stipulates:
246. Foreign Economic Contract Law, art. 6.
247. Sun Ang & Wang Liyu, Shilun Tiaoyue le Guonejfa Xiaoli [A Preliminary Discussion on the
Validity of Treaties in Chinese Domestic Laws], 1986(5) FAxtJE PiNGLuN [LEoAL COMMENTARY] 79, 82.
248. See KRONFOL, supra note 102, at 52.
249. See MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1138-46 (3d Cir. 1988) (discussing
history, purpose, and language of U.S. FCN treaties).
250. Laifian, supra note 137, at 341.
251. See Gu, Concerning Investment, supra note 197, at 18-19.
252. Id. at 18-19.
253. China - Investment Climate Statement, in 1993 NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK, MARKET
REPORTS, Aug. 17, 1993, at para. C(37).
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Mhe investment or income of a national or corporation of either contracting state in the
other country's territory may be nationalized, expropriated or subject to measures which
have the same effect as nationalization or expropriation, only for public purposes relevant
to the needs of the country, on a non-discriminatory basis and subject to the provision of
compensationYm
Similarly, the China-Singapore BIT states that "no expropriation or national-
ization shall be made, except in the public interest, under due process of law
and subject to compensation." This "compensation shall be paid without
unjustified delay and shall be convertible and freely transferable."' The
China-France BIT also specifically covers issues of expropriation and
compensation. 2s6 The treaty states that compensation must be appropriate,
timely, and fully transferable; however, it does not specify a method for
determining the appropriate amount. Furthermore, while compensation must
be determined within a set period, there is no time constraint for the actual
payment of an award. 57
According to Gu Ming, China has encountered two major sticking points
during BIT negotiations: national treatment and compensation. China did not
use the term "national treatment" in the agreements to describe its desire to
treat foreigners and nationals equally. Instead, its BITs specified that "each
contracting state should, under the condition that its laws and regulations
concerning foreign investments are not infringed upon, not discriminate
against investments and investment activities of foreign investors. 2"
Additional protocols further explained and elaborated on this provision. Gu
explains that China has taken this approach because foreign investors cannot
adapt to its planned socialist economy if they are accorded exact national
treatment5 9 In fact, Gu argues, in some instances Chinese law actually
treats foreign investors preferentially. For example, the income tax rate is
55% for state-owned enterprises, but always lower for foreign investors. 20
This would not have been the case, argues Gu, if the BITs included a national
treatment clause.
The second problem is the familiar one of compensation for expropriated
properties. During negotiations, many countries insisted that their BIT with
China provide for "full, timely, and effective" compensation. China, however,
insisted on different language. China's negotiating position was that it should
254. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Danmai Wanguo Zhengfu Guanyu Guli he Xianghu Baohu
Touzi Xieding [Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments], Apr.
29, 1985, P.R.C.-Den., art. 4(l), 1986 CHNESE Y.B. INT'L L. 547, 549.
255. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu he Xinjiapo Gongheguo Zhengfu Guanyu Cujin he
Baohu Touzi Xieding he Huanwen [Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection
of Investments], Nov. 21, 1985, P.R.C.-Sing., art. 6(1), 1986 CHINEsE Y.B. INT'L L. 575, 577.
256. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Falanxi Gongheguo Zhengfu Guanyu Xianghu Guli he Baohu
Touzi de Xieding [Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments],
Mar. 10, 1984, P.R.C.-Fr., art. 4, 1985 CHIESE Y.B. INT'L L. 542, 544.
257. Id. art. 8.
258. Gu, Concerning Investment, supra note 197, at 18.
259. Id. at 18.
260. Id.
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compensate for "liquidated" investment, and should pay only "the value of the
investment at the time of the liquidation, and with interest if payment is
delayed." '261 Gu does not explain the meaning of "liquidation value."
However, Western scholars contend that it is, in essence, the book value of
the company.262 Yet book value has been consistently rejected by the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal as a measure of compensation for expropriation.263
Despite its objection to including in its BITs the words "prompt,
adequate, and effective," or other language equivalent to the Hull rule,
China's official government pronouncements in the early 1980s set forth a
compensation standard close to the Hull formulation.2" Ultimately, the BITs
executed by China used considerably more liberal language regarding
compensation than did official policy pronouncements or legislation. For
example, the 1988 China-Australia BIT stipulates that the compensation for
expropriation should be calculated on the basis of market value before the
taking becomes public.265 Where the market value is difficult to determine,
the compensation should be calculated according to recognized evaluation
standards and equity principles - taking into account the amount of invested
capital, depreciation, remitted capital abroad, renewal value, and other
factors. 266
3. Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations with the United States
The existing trade-related treaties267 between China and the United
States do not adequately address expropriation. For instance, the Investment
Guaranties Treaty deals with expropriatory actions only to the extent that it
recognizes the power of the United States to transfer its rights to the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). 261 OPIC only will insure investment
projects in nations that have signed a treaty recognizing OPIC's right to
acquire by subrogation the insureds' claims. The Investment Guaranties Treaty
does not, however, require China to pay compensation. Since it does not
provide for compensation at all, it obviously sets no standards for compensa-
tion. Thus, the treaty's specific recognition of a subrogation right for claims
against China may be meaningless in practice. On the other hand, the
261. Id. at 19.
262. Henry & Bainbridge, supra note 29, at 1009.
263. The Tribunal's rejection of book value as a measure of compensation is in accordance with
modem financial theory. Id.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 199 to 202.
265. Agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, July 11, 1988,
P.R.C.-Austl., 28 I.L.M. 123, 131.
266. Id.
267. Treaty on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 31 U.S.T. 4652 [hereinafter Trade
Relations Treaty]; Agreement Relating to Investment Guaranties, Oct. 30, 1980, U.S.- P.R.C., T.I.A.S.
No. 9924 (1980) (effected by exchange of notes) [hereinafter Investment Guaranties Treaty]. The Trade
Relations Treaty does not include specific investor-protection measures for expropriatory actions.
268. Investment Guaranties Treaty, supra note 267, arts. 1, 3.
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inclusion of an OPIC subrogation right suggests that the treaty contemplates
some reasonable amount of compensation. In any event, the lacunae in these
treaties further underscore the need for a U.S.-China BIT.
Even after ten years of negotiation, the United States and China have
been unable to reach agreement on a mutual investment protection treaty.269
The principal point of contention has not been the inherent sovereign right to
expropriate, but rather the standard for compensation.27 In May 1982, the
United States delivered to the Chinese government a draft Treaty for Bilateral
Protection of Investment, which provided that "investment shall not be
expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through measures
tantamount to expropriation or nationalization except for a public purpose, in
a non-discriminatory manner, upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation."27' An official of the Chinese Government responded:
None of the investment protection agreements signed by China adopts the principle of
"prompt, adequate and effective" indemnity as advocated by the developed countries. This
principle is not sufficiently reasonable because expropriation and nationalization are the
sovereign acts of a country and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States passed
by the United Nations in 1974 prescribes that "appropriate compensation should be paid."
As a signatory to the Charter, China cannot contravene the reasonable principle enshrined
in the Charter.m
China's objections to the prompt, adequate, and effective standard are
supposedly based on the economic burden that meeting the standard would
entail. In the view of many Chinese commentators, "payment of full
compensation would make nationalization meaningless since it would
undermine the benefits of the expropriation."27 Moreover, the prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation standard is an "outmoded concept" and
"out of pace with the trend of the times. "274 China is simply not willing to
put into formal treaty language what it has essentially already agreed to, using
different language in policy pronouncements and in other BITs. Presumably,
China is reluctant to limit its sovereignty for the long term. The crux of the
problem may be that the Hull formulation of "prompt, adequate, and
effective" has become a term of art, a symbol of domination by developed
over developing nations. Thus, many developing nations, including China,
may accede to an almost identical standard using different terms. Under these
269. Negotiations between China and the United States on mutual protection of investment began as
early as June 1982. See CHINA ECON. NEWS (Hong Kong), June 21, 1982, at 4, cited in Chen, supra note
146, at 47.
270. Amanda Bennett, Reagan Visit to China Breaks Stalemate on Some Questions, But Problems
Remain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1984, at A27.
271. Draft Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Jan. 21,
1983 (revised Feb. 24, 1984), U.S.-P.R.C., reprinted in 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 960, 961 (May 15,
1984).
272. Chen, supra note 146, at 47 (quoting Yuan Zhenmin, Director of the Department of Treaty and
Law, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of China on Agreements for the Protection of
Investment).
273. See YAO MEizHEN, Guoni TOUZiFA [INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW] 350 (1984).
274. Chen, supra note 146, at 47.
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circumstances, it might be more productive for the United States to abandon
its insistence on the precise language of the Hull rule.
V. CONCLUSION
China presents enormous opportunities for foreign investors in the next
several decades. Its markets are extremely large, its demand for an almost
infinite array of products and services untapped, and its need for foreign
capital massive. Of the many uncertainties associated with foreign investment,
the likelihood of expropriation without adequate compensation continues to
trouble many foreign investors. Before committing large resources to China,
prospective investors must be reasonably convinced that their property will not
be expropriated except in the most compelling circumstances and that, if their
property is expropriated, they will be compensated fairly.
In order to illuminate the nature and magnitude of expropriation risk in
today's China, we examined the longstanding international debate over the
proper standard of compensation for expropriation. Developed nations, led by
the United States, have traditionally insisted on the "prompt, adequate, and
effective" formulation of the Hull rule. The international community has never
completely agreed on what this phrase means. It essentially translates into
payment of full going-concern value in a convertible and freely transferable
form. Despite the Western insistence on this standard, expropriation disputes
have almost always been settled for amounts representing only a fraction of
what the Hull rule would call for.
Although some developing countries historically insisted that no
compensation was due, particularly when they expropriated properties as part
of a movement from colonial to independent status, most states now view
"appropriate compensation" as a norm. Although no one has ever defined
appropriate compensation, flexibility is the hallmark of the concept. Under
this standard, the exact amount of compensation is determined on an ad hoe
basis after taking into account a wide variety of factors, such as the returns
already earned by the investor and the host government's ability to pay.
At a theoretical level, the views of the United States and a number of
other developed countries continue to be at odds with the views of most
developing nations. As a practical matter, however, the two sides have been
moving closer together. Movement toward a middle ground has taken the
form of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which generally avoid value-laden
terms like "prompt, adequate, and effective" or "appropriate," and instead
spell out the methods for calculating compensation with as much precision as
possible. They also generally create dispute resolution mechanisms. In
general, the compensation standards adopted in these BITs have not differed
greatly from the Hull formulation.
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China has been sending relatively clear signals that it wishes to become
a full participant in the world economic order while maintaining its planned
socialist economy. Its new constitution and legislation form part of an overall
plan to modernize China's economy. Nevertheless, constitutional and statutory
provisions relevant to expropriation risk, especially the compensation
standard, remain vague enough to give pause to many potential foreign
investors. Although Chinese officials have attempted to reassure investors,
greater clarity in legislation would be more effective. The crux of the problem
is that while China is probably willing to protect foreign investors' interests
in actual practice, it is not willing to surrender its discretion to choose to
behave otherwise. It has, for instance, surrendered its unilateral discretion to
determine compensation in the fifty-two BITs recently executed. In both
theory and practice, China takes its economic treaty commitments very
seriously.
In the end, there is obviously no way to remove all expropriation-related
risk from foreign investment. Carefully crafted BITs are almost certainly the
best solution to the differences that remain between China and other nations
whose businesses are interested in investing in China. The United States needs
to conclude a BIT with China. In this regard, it would be prudent for the
United States to abandon its insistence on the use of the words "prompt,
adequate, and effective" when describing the compensation standard. These
words are so heavily laden with symbolic baggage that the Chinese will never
accept them. The United States loses little by abandoning the precise terms of
the Hull rule, because it can achieve the same result by using other language
more acceptable to China. China, on the other hand, should avoid the
"appropriate compensation" phrase when attempting to conclude a BIT with
the United States because its symbolism is likewise politically unacceptable to
the U.S. government and its investors.275
China's economic incentives will determine the terms of these BITs and
the extent to which they are ultimately honored. There is always some risk
that China's current or future leadership could revert to its earlier closed-door
policy. In such an event, China would no longer desire major foreign
investment and would have no economic incentive to protect it. In our view,
China has come too far economically to reverse its current policies. Given the
275. We are fully aware that the partly rhetorical and partly substantive debate over the expropriation
compensation standard is not the only reason for the failure of the United States and China to conclude
a bilateral investment treaty. Thus, the United States insistence on improvement in China's human rights
record and guarantees of weapons nonproliferation have also been sticking points. See, e.g., China: Trade
Surplus with the U.S., MFN Status Face Clinton, 10 INT'L TR. REP. (BNA) 157 (Jan. 27, 1993). Although
beyond the scope of this article, there is at least a plausible argument to be made that focusing only on
the economic aspects of a BIT would not undermine any leverage we might have to influence noneconomic
concerns such as human rights improvements in China. If the economic and noneconomic issues are
decoupled and a U.S.-China BIT results, one could argue that the increased U.S. investment and
consequent commercial interdependence which almost certainly would follow could place the United States
in an even better position over time to positively influence noneconomic issues such as human rights.
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tragic example of the former Soviet Union's economy, and the success of
China's economic reform efforts to date, the nation is unlikely to close its
doors again. The probability seems quite high, then, that China will continue
to take action to attract substantial foreign investment by making investment
sufficiently safe and remunerative to the investor.
Foreign investment in China is now a reasonably attractive prospect, with
very substantial potential rewards. To further calm the fears of foreign
investors, China must take the next step of consummating more BITs -
especially with the United States.
